The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents by Kapczynski, Amy & Syed, Talha
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
AMY KAPCZYNSKI & TALHA SYED
The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents
ABSTRACT. InIP scholarship, patents are commonly understood as more efficient than other
approaches to innovadon policy. Their primary ostensible advantage is allocadve: as a form of
property rights, patents act as a conduit between market signals and potential innovators,
ostensibly guiding investment toward inventions with the most social value. Exisdng accounts
recognize that, in practice, signals of social value that patents facilitate may be attenuated because
of, for example, transaction costs and limits on the scope and length of patent rights. We show
here, however, a different problem with the conventional allocative account. The appropriability
mechanism patents rely on, namely excludability, operates in asymmetrical ways for different
kinds of informadon goods. While scholars have noted that patent systems fail to create goods
whose value is difficult to appropriate in consumer markets, this fact has not been fiilly
appreciated in the literature, nor have its implications for the standard jusdfication for patents.
Through detailed examples in the health context we show that some kinds of information goods
will be much more difficult to exclude than others. Importandy, there is no reason to expect that
the ease of exclusion will be correlated with social value. The analytic point that emerges is
generalizible: patents themselves can have distortive effects, stemming from structural features
of exclusion rights. Unlike the problem of attenuation, the problem of asymmetric
nonexcludability cannot be resolved by increasing patent scope or length. Because excludability
is variabk along a continuum, property rights in informadon, even if formally perfected, and
even assuming away convendonal transaction costs, will create asymmetrical demand for
different kinds of information goods. This argument provides an important new justification for
alternadves to patents such as government funding and gives us new insights about how to
allocate aich funding. It also reinforces the need for a comparative institutional approach to
innovation policy, and for incorporating into our debates currendy unrecognized implications
that patents may have for values such as privacy and free speech.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year, nearly 30,000 people in the United States die from infections
resulting firom central-line catheters used for monitoring in intensive-care units
(ICUs) in hospitals.' These deaths are in part a result of the growing problem
of antibiotic-resistant infections in hospitals." The intellectual property (IP)
literature is replete with proposals to address that problem by incentivizing the
creation of new antibiotics-proposals that sometimes have price tags in the
billions of dollars.' But in 2006, a different kind of brealcthrough was reported
in the New England Journal of Medicine-a. new technology that reduced the
number of these infections by about two-thirds."* The technology was a humble
checklist, featuring important and well-known hygienic practices such as hand
washing and the use of antiseptic' Clinical trials have shown that the
intervention works in a range of settings, including in otherviase poor-quality
ICUs.* While the mechanism is still somewhat unclear, it seems to work by
giving nurses the authority to enforce the listed practices with doctors and by
improving communication in hospitals in other ways.''
The checklist intervention is a classic information good: it is immaterial
and was much more expensive to create (or to validate, which is often the more
pertinent issue vidth medical interventions, as we will explain) than it is to
copy. By any measure of social welfare, it is also a great intervention. It is
cheap, has no known side effects, and prevents infections up front rather than
simply treating them after the fact. If widely implemented in the United States,
1. Peter Pronovost et al.. An Intervention To Decrease Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infections in
the ICU, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2725, 2726 (2006).
2. Anne Elixhauser & Claudia Steiner, Infections with Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus
(MRSA) in U.S. Hospitals, 1993-2005, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (July
2007), http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb35.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Jörn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means To Incentivize Research
and Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. &ETHICS 240, 241 (2009).
4. Pronovost et al., supra note 1, at 2725.
5. Id. at 2726.
6. Id. ; see also Allison Lipitz-Snyderman et al.. Impact of a Statewide Intensive Care Unit Quality
Improvement Initiative on Hospital Mortality and Length of Stay: Retrospective Comparative
Analysis, 342 BRIT. MED. J. d2i9 (2011) (finding that statewide implementation of checklists
in Michigan significantiy decreased hospital mortality).
7. See, e.g., Charles L. Bosk et al.. Reality Check for Checklists, 374 LANCET 444, 445 (2009).
Pronovost and his colleagues have gone to pains to point out that the checklist intervention
requires not just deployment of a checklist, but other changes in feedback processes and
work culture. Pronovost et al., supra note 1, at 2726-27.
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it could save more than 15,000 lives and $1 billion in treatment costs each year.̂
These flgures are pardcularly impressive when compared to the billion-dollar
figures often attached to proposals for new dmg treatments.
Yet the checklist approach is unlikely to be well rewarded by even a very
expansive patent system. Even if we assume that patent law permits a strong
and enforceable patent on the intervention, it would be difficult for the creator
to use that patent to appropriate any significant proportion of the social value
created by the intervention. He would have to track behavior that is roudne
and to some extent cloaked by privacy norms related to doctor-patient
relationships. Thus, the state of technology and of norms place limits on the
freedom of our hypothetical patentee to enforce his patent. Of course, we
should not overstate the case. An insdtudonal factor would work in the
inventor's favor: the existence of hospitals as an organized intermediary. This
setup reduces the number of potendal infringers and increases the likelihood of
tangible evidence of infringing conduct by creating a "paper trail" of written or
oral records of established hospital protocols. On balance, though, the checldist
will be much less excludable than a dmg.
Recognizing this shortcoming of the patent system draws attention to what
we call "the continuum of excludability." As we elaborate below, excludability
is not a binary quality, either "on" or "off' depending on the availability or
absence of property rights. Radier, it is highly variable across information
goods, and is affected not only by formal legal entidements, but also by
existing technologies for detecdng or tracing such uses (and their costs);
existing social norms regarding "acceptable" or "reasonable" enforcement
efforts (in light of concerns about privacy, freedom of thought and speech, and
so forth); and the existing institutions - or social roles, relations, and
organizational forms-within which the predominant uses of the good will be
made. Once we recognize that excludability is a condnuous and not binary
variable, an impressive array of information goods that are difficult to exclude
even in the presence of patents comes into view.' Our central aim in this Essay
is to develop, with examples in public health, our analydc understanding of the
continuum of excludability, and to elucidate its substandal implications for
innovation theory and policy.
8. STAEE OF H . COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REEORM, HOTH CONG., SURVEY OF STATE
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATIONS: PRACTICES TO PREVENT HOSPITAL-ASSOCIATED BLOODSTREAM
INEECTIONS 2 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter SURVEY OF STATE HOSPITAL ASSOCIATIONS].
9. Although our focus here is on highly nonexcludable information goods, our analysis of the
limits of property rights may also be applicable in the context of other material or
immaterial goods, a point we do not develop here. The analysis offered here may also
provide us with a slightly different way to describe some of the problems with private
provision of network goods and public goods, another issue that we leave for another time.
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The central justification for patent rights in the United States is economic
in nature and is premised on the incentives that they provide to innovators.'"
But patents are only one strategy for incentivizing information production.
Many others exist, and two in particular are much discussed in the economics
literature: public funding (where a government agency either directly carries
out research or sponsors others through grants), and financial inducement
through prizes (where financial rewards are established, typically by the
government, in exchange for specified information goods)."
The most influential theoretical account of the advantages of patents over
these other institutional approaches can be traced to the influential work of
Harold Demsetz.'^ In a 1969 article, Demsetz suggested that patents are
plausibly superior to more direcdy government-led strategies for generating
innovations because markets utilize dispersed private information more
effectively than government actors can.'' Because they link the magnitude and
direction of innovation incentives to market prices, in other words, patents
may be a better mechanism than reliance on government funding for ensuring
that all truly valuable information goods —and only truly valuable information
goods-are generated. Demsetz thought that this allocative advantage of
patents could outweigh their aclcnowledged drawbacks, most prominently the
fact that patents inefficiendy curb the use of protected information.̂ "* Today,
this is the most common justification for patents in the legal literature,'' which
we will call the "allocative" account.
External or foundational critiques could be made of the basic logic of the
allocative case for patents. For example, one might challenge welfarism as a
value, question the relationship between market value and social value, or be
skeptical of the positive assumptions of the underlying "homo economicus"
model of innovator motivations. We set aside such foundational objections
10. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 14 (5th ed. 2010); William Fisher, Theories cf Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169
(Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property
Law, in 2 FlANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1471, 1476-82 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell eds., 2007).
11. For a well-known comparison of the merits of these three strategies, see Brian D. Wright,
The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON.
REV. 691 (1983).
12. See infra Part I.
13. Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & EcON. 1, 11-14
(1969).
14. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra Part I.
15. See infra note 39.
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here, and, for the sake of argument, accept the basic premises invoked by the
conventional account.'*
The main internal criticism of the allocative account in the existing
literature points out that patents will systemadcally underreward research
because they yield less than fiill appropriability (for example, because patents
have a limited term and can be designed around, and because transaction costs
interfere with market signaling).'^ These concerns, however, are not so much a
criticism of the allocative case for patents as a worry over obstacles to its full
realization. Here we develop an account of a different problem with the
allocative case foi- patents. The link that Demsetz drew between exclusion
rights and revenues for creators assumed that exclusion rights do not
themselves introduce distordons into the equation between production and
social value. But this is not the case.
We offer a series of detailed examples to show that some Icinds of
information goods will be much more difficult to exclude (and thus to
commodity) than others. Importandy, there is no reason to expect that the ease
of exclusion will be correlated with social value. Thus, patents themselves can
have distortive effects, stemming from structural features of exclusion rights.
Importantly, the problem of nonexcludability cannot be resolved by increasing
patent scope or length, and it is asymmetrical with respect to different types of
information goods. The continuum of nonexcludability thus means that
property rights, even if perfected, and even assuming away convendonal
transacdon costs, will create asymmetrical demand for different kinds of
information goods.'^
Other scholars have pointed out that patent systems fail to create goods
whose value is difficult to appropriate in consumer markets." But the fact that
16. In Secdon III.C we will consider the implications of our arguments for moving beyond the
internal critique.
17. See infra Part I.
18. By "convendonal" transaction costs we mean the search, negodadon, and enforcement costs
involved in making and upholding pdvate bargains (as well as those involved in the
definition and enforcement of any legal endtlements at issue). The contrasdng set of "costs"
or barriers that are the focus of our analysis stem from the exisdng state of technology,
norms, and insdtudons, as specified infra Secdon I.B. Although many of these barriers may
also be conceived in terms of "costs," not all are useñilly understood in diis manner, and in
any case such "costs" (for instance, those involved in developing new technologies for
surveillance or changing widespread pdvacy norms) are not plausibly subsumed under an
analydcally useful concepdon of transacdon costs.
19. Brett Frischmann's work is perhaps the leading example in tbe IP literature. As he points
out in his recent book, IP systems work
in deliberate and unavoidable reliance on the market mechanism, which exhibits a
predictable bias for intellectual goods that generate the most appropdable value in
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excludability operates in asymmetrical ways for different ldnds of information
goods has not been fully appreciated, nor have its implications for the standard
allocative case for patents. Part I illuminates our analytic arguments in more
detail, while Part II illustrates the continuum of excludability and its
importance with three examples: hospital checklists, negative information
about drugs, and information and interventions regarding "lifestyle" risk
factors. All three cases identify highly nonexcludable information goods-and
position them opposite pharmaceutical products-to show that even though
the less excludable innovations may plausibly outperform the pharmaceutical
alternatives (in terms of net social benefit provided), a patent system will tend
to promote the excludable pharmaceutical approaches over the less excludable
alternatives.
consumer markets. As a result, various socially desirable intellectual goods —basic
research, drugs for diseases in small markets, well-reasoned political dialogue,
and 'fair and balanced' news reporting, to name just a few—remain
underproduced even with intellectual property regimes in place.
BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE 109 (2012). Frischmann is primarily interested in the
problem of externalities, and here he groups together problems related to
nonexcludability-for example, basic research and well-reasoned dialogue—v\ath other
problems that disrupt the link between markets and social value. (For example, the
undersupply of drugs for diseases with small markets is not primarily due to persistent
nonexdudability, but rather to the fact that inability to pay dilutes the signal of social value
perceived by innovators in a global market.) Carol Rose has called attention to similar
dynamics in the environmental context, noting that
rational economic decision-making favors investments in scientific investigation
where there is some potential for private gains at the end of the road-that is,
where the end-product can be turned into property. . . . [HJence there is a gap •
between research whose results can be propertized relatively easily, and research
whose results cannot be so easily propertized, even though the latter might much
enhance our collective welfare.
Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation arui Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations,
32 ENVTL. L. 755, 764 (2002). Our contribution is to develop this general point into an
analytically detailed conception of the continuum of excludability, and to draw out its
important implications for the traditional allocative case for patents.
It is also worth noting the affinity between our argument and Richard Nelson's
pioneering justification for government funding of basic research. As Nelson argued, the
"yield" from foimdational or basic scientific research, in terms of practical applications, is
too uncertain and, more importandy, far off in the future to be adequately incentivized by
private markets. Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J.
POL. ECON. 297, 304 (1959). Nelson's argument pertains to how patents track a
suboptimality in the market (particularly regarding discount rates), while ours pertains to
how patents suboptimally track market value. Despite this distinction, however, our
argument shares with Nelson's the implication that there are certain kinds of information
goods that cannot be adequately incentivized by property rights, regardless of how
expansive such rights become.
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In Part III, we draw out the central implications that emerge from our
analysis. We begin by developing the point that patent rights have the
potential to predictably and systematically distort private investment decisions
over innovations by overstating the value of highly excludable information
goods and understating the value of highly nonexcludable ones."" As a result,
patents will fail to incentivize many significant innovations (even if we were to
increase the lengdi or scope of their protection), and indeed may promote the
production of less valuable inventions over the production of more valuable
ones. The possible first-order distortions that we identify can also become
entrenched over time as institutions, training, and cultural habits incline
individuals to look for excludable solutions. The continuum of excludability
thus opens up new ways of understanding the forces that lie behind important
phenomena in our existing institutional environment, such as the widely
shared sense that our current healthcare system is "overmedicalized,"
or disproportionately focused on technological - and particularly
pharmaceutical-interventions. Finally, we show here that our analysis, though
illustrated in the context of health innovation, is not limited to that domain.
The distortive potential of patents exists across different technological
domains, although, for reasons we will describe, it may be easier to identify,
and have more consequential effects, in some domains than others.
We move next to policy implications. Our analysis suggests a new
justification for institutional approaches to innovation that do not rely on
exclusionary mechanisms (including public funding, prizes, commons-based
approaches, and regulatory approaches). Such alternatives can help promote
important but highly nonexcludable innovations that would be neglected by
the patent system, and also help to counter the distortionary pressures that
may be generated by patents. Moreover, our argument gives new support to
20. Our argument here builds on earlier treatments. Arnold Plant noted long ago that patents
may divert effort from inventive activity that is not patentable toward activity that is
patentable. See Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions,
1 ECONÓMICA 30, 42 (1934). Plant was referring not to inventive activity that could not be
patented, but to activity that was left out of patent law at the time (for example, plant
breeding). Id. at 45; cf'. C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDLA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 17 (2002)
(pointing out that existing copyright law covers expression but not facts, and will therefore
distort investment toward entertainment rather than news). This point is susceptible to the
rejoinder that exclusive rights should be extended to the omitted domains. Our point is that
exclusive rights themselves have limits, and will generate asymmetries that cannot be
remedied through extensions of those exclusive rights. Along similar lines, Glynn Lunney
has pointed out the possible distortionary effects of IP incentives on activities in other,
unrelated sectors of the economy, as opposed to on innovation activities for which IP
protection is unavailing. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996). For fiirther discussion, see infra note 146 and
accompanying text.
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the traditional case for public funding of basic research. The conventional case
is based on the long-term and uncertain character of the dividends of such
research." We add a further consideradon-namely, the highly nonexcludable
character of many outputs of basic research. At the same time, our argument
suggests diat the traditional case for publicly funded research is too narrow,
because it focuses on "upstream" research. Where information goods are
highly nonexcludable, markets will undersupply them, suggesting that
governments should be involved in not just basic research, but a range of
applied research targeting nonexcludable interventions.
Finally, we discuss a set of broader theoretical implications. First, our
analysis highlights a previously unnoticed means by which patents and the
pursuit of efficiency through patent law can generate conflict with
non-welfarist values such as privacy and free speech. Recognizing this potential
conflict has important implications, particularly for arguments about the
proper scope of patent law. Second, our analysis suggests that reasoning about
the most cost-effective way to produce information should be understood as a
process of rough judgment rather than optimization. What is needed is a
comparative institutional approach to informadon policy, one that incorporates
an understanding of the continuum of excludability and, moreover, factors in
both efficiency and non-efficiency values.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CONTINUUM OF EXCLUDABILITY
A. Patents as a Solution to Information Goods'Appropriability Problem
Patents are intended to allow market-driven innovation by permitting
inventors to exclude others from the results of their investment, and thereby to
appropriate its returns.
Given our focus on excludability here, it makes sense to say a bit more
about the relationship between exclusion and appropriation in the context of
information goods. Conventional economic actors will only produce a good
when they can appropriate sufficient returns to recoup the capitalized costs of
providing the good. (We use the term "appropriate" here in its broadest sense,
to simply mean obtain or secure.) One way to appropriate returns from
producing information is by selling the information itself, or by selling an
information-embedded good. This is a commodity strategy, and it typically
requires exclusion of others from the information in question. (If no one is
excluded from the information, then the first attempt at exchange may
Richard Nelson's work was foundational on this point. See Nelson, supra note 19.
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undermine all others.) One way to exclude others from information is to use
simple secrecy." Such secrecy does not work when you are selling information
itself (absent IP rights), since you must reveal it to sell it. But secrecy can work
as an exclusionary strategy if the information is embedded in a good and is
difficult to obtain from reverse engineering that good."' By contrast, secrecy is
not an option if the valuable information may be easily obtained by reverse
engineering."^ The difficulty of the secrecy strategy in the context of
information goods is one key component of the economic argument for
intellectual property rights, which offer creators the possibility of exclusion
without secrecy.
There are also many nonexclusionary ways to appropriate returns from
information. Most importantly for our purposes, a creator can produce
information in exchange for a government reward, such as a prize or a
government grant. Here, the creator appropriates returns, but no one is
excluded from the information produced. There are also market-based
nonexclusion strategies to appropriate returns from information production.
For example, first-mover advantages may be the basis for returns,"' as may
22. Here we do not mean trade secrecy, which is a form of IP involving government
enforcement, but rather the straightforward strategy of keeping something secret.
23. Famously, the family that made Stradivarius violins never revealed their techniques, which
remain somewhat mystedous to diis day, and are the continuing subject of intense, if
inconclusive, invesdgadons. Compare Graham Tibbets, Secret of Stradivarius Violin's
Superiority Uncovered, TELEGRAPH (London), July 1, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/news/worldnews/europe/nethedands/2230123/Secret-of-Stradivarius-violins-superiority
-uncovered.html (repordng findings of a study using a CT scanner, claiming that the
violins' superiodty lies in the density ofthe wood used), with Richard A. Lovett, 'Alchemy'
Was the Secret to Making Stradivarius Violins, Study Says, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC N E W S , NOV.
29, 2006, http://news.nadonalgeographic.com/news/2006/11/061129-violins-alchemy.html
(reporting findings of a study using magnedc resonance and infrared spectroscopy, claiming
that the secret lies in "chemical tricks" used by the makers, amoundng to a "magic podon"),
and Richard Gray, The Secret Behind a Stradivarius-Imperfection, TELEGRAPH (London),
Dec. 2, 2012, http://wvirw.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9716271/The-secret-behind
-a-Stradivarius-imperfecdon.html (repordng findings of a study using high-energy light
beams from a pardde accelerator, claiming diat the secret lies in imperfecdons in the wood
used).
24. Think here of the design of a mousetrap, or the composidon of a pharmaceudcal in the
context ofthe modern regulatory state that requires disclosure of its chemical makeup. The
ability to use secrecy can be enhanced technologically, as when a company releases a piece of
software but encrypts it so that others cannot access the code. But encrypdon schemes can
be cracked, meaning that encrypdon often requires legal reinforcement to act as a successful
exclusion strategy. And-circumvendon laws are to encryption what trade secrecy laws are to
secrecy.
25. By this we mean factors such as consumer loyalty, establishing distdbudon networks,
fixed-cost barriers to compedtive entry, lead time in sales, or learning-curve advantages-
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ancillary rights such as trademark.'* Think here of the fashion industry, where
designs are easily reverse engineered and no IP right direcdy covers fashion
design, but where first-mover advantages and trademarks allow designers to
appropriate some of the returns from their creadons.'^ Creators can also profit
by selling the customization of information goods as a service, but not
excluding anyone from the information goods themselves, as the Linux-based
firm Red Hat does when it customizes open-source software for clients, or as a
lawyer might do when she writes a customized brief for a client.'
Crowdsourcing strategies may also allow a creator to appropriate returns from
an informational work without exercising exclusionary control over it."'
The conventional economic debate is primarily between a subset of these
strategies-typically, IP rights, prizes, and ex ante public funding. That is
because that debate is premised upon a set of assumpdons, including that the
information in question is relatively expensive to produce (so that first-mover
advantages and trademark are an inadequate reward), and inexpensive to
reproduce or difficult to keep secret (so that secrecy is not viable).^" In the
pages that follow, we work from these same assumptions in order to address
the implications of patents in their most favorable context.
In the debate between patents, prizes, and public funding, the patent
approach has some well-lcnown drawbacks. Because information is nonrival,
meaning that its use by one person does not detract from its simultaneous use
by others, the grant of exclusion rights threatens to produce an inefficient
underuse of said information. Due to transaction costs and other barriers to
perfectly tailored price discrimination and licensing agreements, the price(s)
but not the time it takes someone to reverse engineer informadon from a good, since that
process involves exclusion via secrecy.
26. Note that trademark does involve exclusive rights, but the trademark dght covers the mark
rather than the informadon itself. Think here of a company selling a branded generic drug,
where the drug itself is not patented, but the trademark is protected as a source of
informadon to consumers.
27. See Kal Rausdala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L . REV. 1687 (2006).
28. See YOCHAI BENKLER, T H E WEALTH OF NETWORKS : H o w SocLfu. PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 43,45-46 (2006).
29. Crowd-sourcing strategies that distribute informadon without restriction but ask for
contribudons are becoming quite common in the creadve arts. See, for example, Radiohead
Reveal How Successful 'In Rainbows' Download Really Was, NME (Oct. 15, 2008),
http://www.nme.com/news/radi0head/40444; and SITA SINGS THE BLUES, http://www
.sitasingstheblues.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
30. The customizadon strategy is not typically discussed in conventional economic debates,
perhaps because the informadon in question may be usefiil to only one or a limited number
of clients, so does not exhibit public goods problems in the usual sense.
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charged by the patentee will price out some consumers and follow-on
innovators who are willing and able to pay the marginal cost of distributing the
information good, but not the patentee's markup, resulting in what economists
refer to as "deadweight loss."''
It was these drawbacks that long ago led Kenneth Arrow to argue that
government funding was preferable to patents as a mode of innovation policy.
He emphasized that government funding can provide the benefit of
incentivizing information production without the static and dynamic costs
from foregone uses of the information so generated.'^ Demsetz provided the
canonical reply: while Arrow emphasized the benefits of marginal-cost pricing
of information, Demsetz focused instead on "the production of knowledge at
efficient rates."" A system of private market rights would, Demsetz suggested,
be superior to government in one important allocative sense: it would produce
superior "information on the desired directions of investment and on the
quantities of resources that should be committed to invention."'^
Demsetz's argument here owes much to Hayek's ideas about the
informational advantages of disaggregated private actors over centralized
government decisionmalcers." In this account, property rights are said to have
a fundamental advantage in guiding the efficient production of information
because they harness price signals to provide creators with information about
how to direct and allocate the resources that they invest in producing
information. The argument for patents is thus premised on a posited
relationship between rights to exclude and the use of private information about
31. See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J.L. & ECON. 525,529 (2001).
32. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
33. Demsetz, supra note 13, at 13.
34. Id. at 12.
35. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 A M . E C O N . REV. 519, 521 (1945). This
argument can be further traced back to Mill, who advanced the link forged by patents
between innovation incentives and market measures of social value as a key consideration in
patents' favor over government rewards. See 2 J O H N STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY, bk. 5, ch. 10, § 4 (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 6th ed. 1864) (1848). Another
important antecedent of Demsetz's position is, of course, Coase's comparative-institutional
analysis of the respective advantages and drawbacks of government and market solutions to
externality problems, an analysis that also bears the strong stamp ofthe Hayekian infiuence.
SeeR.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.&ECON. 1 ( i960) .
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the value of inventions.'*
Though it was not the central point of Demsetz's article (which aimed
primarily to promote a comparative institutional approach to economics),''' his
argument about the informational advantages of patents has become central to
our contemporary understanding of the economics of patent rights. For
example, leading accounts of the comparative institutional benefits of patents
versus financial prizes and government funding emphasize that patents' key
advantage as a method of stimulating innovation is their superior ability to
make use of private information about the value of prospective inventions.'^
Similar invocations of the allocative case for IP rights resound throughout IP
scholarship, refiecting the deep infiuence of Demsetz's argument." Moreover, a
36. Patents also make use of private information about the comparative efficiency of different
approaches to information production, but as Wright points out, prizes may do this as well.
Wright, supra note 11, at 703.
37. Demsetz, supra note 13, at 1.
38. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2002); Wright, supra note 11, at 703. There has been a resurgence of interest
recently in comparative analysis of patents and innovation policy alternatives, particularly,
but not exclusively, among economists. See Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of
Property Rights in Information: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives To
Generate Information, and the Altemative of a Govemment-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDLA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998); Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism
for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q J . ECON. 1137 (1998); Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 31;
Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L . REV. 115 (2003); Aidan Hollis, An
Efficient Reward System for Pharmaceutical Innovation, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 6, 2004),
http://www.who.in0ntellectualproperty/news/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf; Stephen M.
Maurer, The Right Tool(s): Designing Cost-Effective Strategies for Neglected Disease
Research, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty
/studies/S.Maurer.pdf; James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes To Stimulate R&D
for Neiv Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007); Aidan HoUis & Thomas Pogge, The
Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All, INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL
HEALTH (2008), http://healthimpactfund.com/publications; William W. Fisher & Taiha
Syed, A Prize System as a Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the Developing World, in
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH : PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES
181 (Thomas Pogge et al. eds., 2010). For a discussion in the copyright context,
see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003); and WILLIAM W . FISHER III,
PROMISES T O KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 199-258
(2004). Although this literature has adduced numerous other considerations regarding the
comparative merits and drawbacks of IP rights and alternatives, the particular consideration
we highlight here has not been among them.
39. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 146 (rev. ed. 2003) (stating that prices "have the salutary eff[ect] of signaling
consumer preference and channeling private investment in the right directions"); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, T H E ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
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subset of these IP scholars, whom we call "optimizers," have extended the
conventional allocative case for some property rights in information into a more
ambitious aim: the pursuit of a global optimum through the fine-tuned
expansion of such rights, guided more by neoclassical conceptions of efficiency
in general equilibrium than by the comparative-institutional orientation of
Demsetz's original article.*"
There are existing critiques of the economic logic of the allocative account.
Perhaps the most influential of these points out that transaction costs will
interfere vvdth market signaling and, as a result, that patent-based approaches
will systematically underrepresent true market demand." '̂ For example, for
LAW 24 (2003) (arguing that government financing of information is inferior to IP because it
"substitut[es] a governmental determination of the value of particular types of intellectual
property for a market determination"); MERGES ET AL., supra note 10, at 18 ("[IP] rights
have the advantage of limiting the government's role in allocating resources to a finite set of
decentralized decisions: whether particular inventions are worthy of a fixed period of
protection. The market then serves as the principle engine of progress."); Fisher, supra note
10, at 178-79 (describing the role in the IP literature of the argument that private markets
can best guide investment decisions); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1611-12 (1982) ("Though taxation and centralized purchasing might provide a
satisfactory solution for some public goods problems . . . for works of expression, the public
goods problem is addressed by another method.... [T]he law provides a means for
excluding nonpurchasers. Copyright law therefore allows a market for intellectual property
to function." (footnotes omitted)); Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 10, at 1499 ("In the
context of stand-alone inventions or creations, intellectual property rewards reflect the social
value of the contribution, since the profit is determined by demand.").
40. See, e.^., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 178-79; Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The
Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557
(1998); Frank H. Easterbrook, Who Decides the Extent of Rights in Intellectual Property?, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 405 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Trotter Hardy,
Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. C H I . LEGAL F. 217; F. Scott Kieff, Property
Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 M I N N . L . REV. 697 (2001). The
primary inspiration for this optimizing line of scholarship, it bears noting, is not Demsetz's
1969 essay on the comparative virtues of patents versus public funding, but rather his
foundational 1967 essay outiining a general theory of property rights based on internalizing
externalities. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 312 n.117 (1996) ("The inclusion of copyright within the post-Coasean neoclassical
umbrella began with Harold Demsetz's landmark essay setting forth the basic tenets of
neoclassical property theory."). It should also be noted that Demsetz's 1967 argument
differs to some extent from those of the scholars we cite here; Demsetz's claims sound
primarily in a positive and explanatory register, while the arguments advanced by these later
scholars building on his work are more clearly prescriptive.
41. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007) ; Zvi
Griliches, The Search for R&D Spillovers, 94 SCANDANAVIAN J. EcON. S29 (1992); Edwin
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consumptive uses of the good, various obstacles to perfect price discrimination
will mean that patentees will capture only a portion of the value from
consumed uses (and, of course, no value from those potential uses that are
priced out). A similar situation applies for follow-on innovative uses of the
good, due to transaction costs and other barriers to strildng perfecdy tailored
and complete licensing deals.*^ A related argument points out that patent law
itself is limited, thus confining the potential returns for irmovators. For
example, patents are term-limited, restricting the time over which an innovator
can appropriate the social value of the innovation."*' Similarly, the current
criteria for patentability may fail to cover information that, although valuable
and expensive to generate, nevertheless does not meet existing patent
requirements such as novelty and nonobviousness."*^ These concerns, however,
do not advance criticisms of the allocative case for patents so much as worries
regarding its full realization. And they have tended to result in the following
responses: that patent rights should be strengthened, that transaction costs can
or should be reduced, and that these concerns do not fundamentally
undermine a preference for private property rights since property-based
allocative signals, while attenuated, are still fiindamentally aligned with social
In this Essay, we focus on a different problem with the allocative account:
its assumption that excludability is relatively unproblematic in the presence of
Mansfield et al.. Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 QJ. ECON.
221 (1977)-
42. See, e.g., jEAN TiROLE, T H E THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 389-421 (1988) ; BCremer,
siiprflnote38, at 1140-42; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 31, at 534.
43. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 296; Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for
Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L . REV. 803, 832-33 (2007) (describing how the
twenty-year life of patents insufficiendy stimulates innovation in industdes with long dme
horizons for appropriation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L . & ETHICS 717, 720-24 (2005); see abo Eric E. Johnson, Calibrating Patent
Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HiGH TECH. L.J. 269, 297-99, 297 n.92 (2006)
(reviewing the economic literature on opdmal patent duradon).
44. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 722; Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard
of Patentability, 87 TEX. L . REV. 503 (2009).
45. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 178-79, 224; Bell, supra note 40, at 567-71, 580-92,
600; Easterbrook, supra note 40, at 411-13; Hardy, supra note 40, at 231, 234-58: Kieff, supra
note 40, at 717-36; Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, Sci. AM. , Mar. 1997, at 78. For cddcal
responses to this line of argument, see Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MiCH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Brett M.
Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L . & EcON. 649
(2007); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L . REV. 1031
(2005) ; and Netanel, supra note 38. Roin suggests mimicking (rather than strengthening)
patents via clinical-data-exdusivity requirements. See Roin, supra note 44, at 564-68.
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property rights. This assumption is refiected in Demsetz's original argument,
where he asserts: "Appropriability is largely a matter of legal arrangements and
the enforcement of these arrangements by private or public means. The degree
to which knowledge is privately appropriable can be increased by raising the
penalties for patent violations and by increasing resources for policing patent
violations.'"** Shordy following this formulation, Demsetz offers this
somewhat more modest surmise:
The truth of the matter is that I, at least, have no more than casual
notions about the cost, per dollar value of knowledge, of establishing
property rights in information. Given the appropriate legal apparatus
and schedule of penalties it may be no more difficult to police property
rights in many Idnds of loiowledge than it is to prevent the theft of
automobiles and cash. And even if some kinds of information are more
difficult to protect, I am not sure which institutions yield the better
soludon to the problem or what public policy deduction should be
Where appropriability is a problem, it can generally be increased by legal
arrangements, as Demsetz suggests. Patents will typically permit more
appropriability than exists without patents, and ratcheting up patent law in
various ways (for example, by increasing penalties for infringement), generally
will increase appropriability for the covered information. But some kinds of
information are more difficult to protect with patents than others, as we will
show. Put in the language of cost, the same legal entidement to a patent can
have very different costs of deployment, depending on the kind of information
that is covered by the patent."*^ In the presence of patent rights, information
that is more readily excludable will yield greater private returns than equally
socially valuable information that is less readily excludable. This tradeoff has
significant consequences both for theory and policy.
To formalize and simplify the point, we conventionally want investors to
invest when the expected value of a good is greater than the expected cost
(c < v). It is well recognized that an innovator can expect to enjoy not a full
share of the social value created by the good, but only some fraction of that
value (o < a < l). If this fraction-while not l —is at least constant, then there
46. Demsetz, supra note 13, at 10.
47. Id. at 10-11.
48. Patents on different kinds of informadon goods are also not equally cosdy for the state to
create or enforce. The state may bear such costs in different ways, such as providing
resources for examinadon, adjudicadon, and enforcement (for example, at the nadonal
borders). This point is of some importance, but not the subject of our analysis here.
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is no distortion introduced into the production function and investment will
occur whenever c < av. If, however, a is variable, then its introduction into the
production function will distort investment choices : excludability, rather than
the ratio of social value to cost alone, will infiuence what is produced.*'
B. The Key Determinants of Excludability
Analytically, the degree to which excludability works as a solution to the
appropriability problem depends on how much of the good's social value can
be privately internalized by exclusion. Appropriability in this context, then, is a
function of how effectively (or cheaply) the exclusionary mechanism can be
deployed. In the presence of a patent, effective exclusion requires monitoring
and identification of possible infringers and subsequent deployment of legal
entidements. To better understand when and why excludability may or may
not work for any one type of good, we need to understand the factors shaping
the conditions for its success.
Three infiuences are of particular importance. The first is the state of
existing technology. For some information goods, much of the valued use may
simply involve absorbing the information into thought, which is at present
technically impossible to monitor, much less prevent. An inventor who was
able to obtain a patent on a basic scientific principle —or on the insight, for
example, that quitting smoldng reduces the risk of heart attack—would have a
great deal of difficulty detecting unapproved uses of this information.
Sometimes technologies will exist to detect an infringement—say, verbal
communication of information from person to person—but will be expensive
to deploy on a large scale. Invariably, the cost of enforcement will thus depend
in part on the availability and cost of existing technologies to detect
infringement.^" And there is no reason to thinlc that the cost and existence of
49. The result is akin to "Campbell's Law" in the context of education policy, which asserts that
when we use intermediate indicators of a value as a stand-in for an ultimate value that is
hard to measure (such as when we use test scores to measure educational attainment), we
distort behavior toward the indicator and away from the value it is meant to measure. See
Donald T. Campbell, Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change, 2 EVALUATION &
PROGRAM PLAN. 67, 85 (1979) ("The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social
decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressure and the more apt it will
be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor."). In the educational
context, relying on test scores ultimately encourages "teaching to the test." In information
production, using patents as a measure of social value results in "inventing to the patent."
We thank Yair Listokin for helping us see this parallel.
50. The same is true of technologies needed to threaten or initiate legal action, but these are not
our focus here, in part because they may not introduce the same asymmetries across types of
information.
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such technology will vary in ways that are systematically correlated with the
social value of the covered information.
The second influence is social norms. For some information goods,
technology will permit monitoring at an acceptable economic cost, but such
monitoring will be normatively unacceptable. For example, it may be
technically and economically feasible to monitor communications between
doctors and patients, or between individuals in other therapeutic settings (for
example, addiction support groups), but such surveillance would likely be too
intmsive of privacy or burdensome on speech to be acceptable. Highly
entrenched norms may also be refiected in law and will thus be particularly
costly to override. The First Amendment, for example, codifies commitments
to free speech that could extend to the patent context.^' State sovereign
immunity doctrines codify norms against extracting monetary compensation
from state governments, which could also interfere with the ability to enforce
patents on, say, legislative innovations.'^ Indeed, constitutional and private law
restrictions on privacy invasion could be implicated in the patent context, and
so forth. And, as with technology, there is little reason to believe any systematic
correlation exists between the social value of information and the extent to
which it can be effectively protected without mnning afoul of strongly held
social norms.
The third infiuence is perhaps less intuitive than the first two, but no less
important. The existence of a wide variety of institutions will infiuence the
viability and effectiveness of exclusion rights over information—again in ways
that do not systematically vary vvâth the social value of the information." We
use "institutions" here in both its classical sociological sense of social roles,
relations, and mies through which convergent expectations and patterns of
conduct are congealed or stabilized (including, but not exclusively, through
legal arrangements), as well as in a broader, looser sense that also encompasses
"organizations" of various sorts —as "players" in a "game" stmctured by
institutional mles.̂ '* For example, hospitals are organizations, and their
51. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L . REV. 99 (2000) (discussing tensions
between patent law and the First Amendment in the context of software).
52. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
53. There is a parallel between this notion and a point that some have made in the property law
scholarship. As some scholars have pointed out, Demsetz's famous argument that property
will emerge when resources become more valuable also takes institutions for granted, since
it does not acknowledge the need for effective legal institutions to create and police property
rights. See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third
World Tragedy of Contested Access, 115 YALE L.J. 996,1007-08 (2006).
54. In the classical sociological sense of the term, "institutions" are often synonymous with
"social structure." See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE
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existence influences the excludability of a patent on checklists, as suggested
above. Tort law can also be considered a lcind of institution. That is, the fact
that tort mies may operate to render hospitals or other medical providers liable
for not using state-of-the-art techniques may lower the cost of enforcing patent
rights across a range of medical technologies.
Though it is more difficult to see, the absence of certain institutional
relations or organizational forms may also render information less excludable.
For example, if no organization is needed to mediate or transmit the
information that smoking causes heart attaclcs, it will be relatively more
difficult to track and exclude people from that informadon. Consider a last
example: in the pharmaceudcal context, patents on "methods of use" are quite
common. A patent of this sort might claim the information that, say, the
compound imatinib mesylate is effective against a particular form of cancer."
Such a patent prevents not the use of imatinib mesylate itself, but only its use
for the treatment of the specified form of cancer. The information covered is
highly immaterial—it pertains not to the drug itself, but to a particular
intended use of the drug, and as such we might think it would be very difficult
to exclude others from exploiting this information. But institutions such as
public and private insurance, medical licensing laws, and drug regulatory laws
OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION 16-17, 24 (1984) (noting that "'structure' is usually
understood . . . by the vast majority of social analysts-as some kind of'patterning' of social
relations or social phenomena" with "institutions" being those patterning "practices which
have the greatest time-space extension" or which embody "the more enduring features of
social life"); Kieran Healy, Sociology, in 1 A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 88 (Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge eds., 2d ed. 2007) (tracing
as a common theme among otherwise divergent sociological schools an emphasis on "social
structure" and "social institutions" in conditioning individuals' preferences, capacities, and
choices). A similar notion is deployed by economists taking an "institutionalist" turn. See
SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS: BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS, AND EVOLUTION 47-48, 368
(2004) ("Institutions . . . are the laws, informal rules, and conventions that give a durable
structure to social interactions among the members of a population."); ROBIN HAHNEL &
MICHAEL ALBERT, QUIET REVOLUTION IN WELFARE ECONOMICS 127-29 (1990} (defining
institutions as "conglomerations of interrelated roles" or "commonly held expectations"
about appropriate behavior patterns). Bowles also provides a useful discussion of the
relation between this notion of "institutions" and that of "otganizations," which tracks the
meanings we give these terms in this Essay. BOWLES, supra, at 48-49. In the context of
innovation theory, a similar development of the two concepts and the distinction between
them is provided in Pavel Pelikan, Can the Imperfect Innovation Systems of Capitalism Be
Outperformed?, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 370 (Giovanni Dosi et al.
eds., 1988).
55. See Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh
Myi): An Empirical Analysis of "Secondary" Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://www.plosone.or¿'article/info%3Adoi%2Fio.i37i%2FjournaI.pone.oo49470.
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all function to make these kinds of patents relatively excludable in practice.'*
This result is easy to see if we compare a patent on a particular use of imatinib
mesylate to a patent on a particular use of aspirin. The discovery that aspirin
reduces the risk of heart attacks and stroke for those who have already had
them was an important advance in medical knowledge.'^ But aspirin is also an
over-the-counter medication, and as such it interacts differendy than imatinib
mesylate with health insurance, the medical profession, and drug regulatory
authorities. Aspirin's over-the-counter nature makes infringing uses of it much
more difficult to detect than infringing uses of imatinib mesylate. As such, the
same exact kind of patent—a patent on a method of a compound to be used to
treat a particular disease - exhibits wildly different levels of excludability, for
reasons that can best be described as features ofthe institutional context.
All three factors can, to some extent, also be expressed in the language of
costs. That is, under a given state of technology, norms, and institutions, some
information will be more or less cosdy to exclude others from. With enough
resources, the state of existing technology can presumably be altered, at least to
a significant extent. And likewise, perhaps, with existing norms and
institutions. Thus, over time, the state of technology, norms, and institutions is
likely, to some degree, endogenous to the design of patent Iaw.'̂  But there will
be limits on the ability of innovators to change norms, institutions, and
technologies (which to some degree can be expressed in terms of the ratio of
56. FDA rules, for example, require all drugs to be approved before being sold in interstate
commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). The need for FDA approval means that companies
may gain effective control over all sales of a drug even when they have a patent only over
certain uses, because no one else may sell the compound without submitting trial data to the
FDA. If two companies were to have FDA approval for selling the same active ingredient for
different uses, and patents on their different uses, regulatory and insurance rules might still
help them enforce their patents. See, e.g.. Prescription Drug Adverdsing, 21 C.F.R.
§ 2O2.i(e)(4) (2012) (prohibidng manufacturers from direcdy markedng off-label uses for
their approved drugs); Am. Soc'y of Clinical Oncology, Reimbursement for Cancer Treatment:
Coverage of Off-Label Drug Indications, 24 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3206 (2006) (describing the
refusal by private insurers and Medicare to reimburse many ofF-label uses for cancer drugs);
Alexander T. Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug Prescribing,
INDEP. REV. , Summer 2000, at 25, 35-36 (describing insurance companies' resistance to
reimbursing for off-label prescriptions and the responding movement to require
reimbursement in certain cases).
57. See, e.g.. Recommendations of Aspirin for Prevention of Cardiovascular Dbease, CENTER FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/heartdisease/aspirin.htm (last
updated Sept. 12, 2011).
58. For example, if patent law is expanded in ways that make patents on thought more viable,
we would expect patentees to exert pressure on norms, insdtutions, and technologies to
facilitate the enforcement of such patents. This dynamic has important implicadons for the
relationship between patents and nonefficiency values, as we discuss in Part III.
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cost to return, and diminishing marginal returns). Even in the long run and
allowing some endogeneity, then, we cannot expect social value and the cost of
exclusion to be closely correlated.
As the following sections will describe in more detail, under existing
conditions of technology, norms, and institutions, we can identify key
characteristics of highly nonexcludable information. Most saliendy, uses of
information goods that manifest in relatively more immaterial fashion will be
more difficult to exclude, because the state of technology makes monitoring
intangible processes (like thoughts) more difficult than monitoring more
tangible things. Here, norms buttress technology. Or perhaps it is the other
way around: part of the reason more invasive surveillance technologies do not
exist may be that they are deemed normatively unacceptable. Generally, the
more immaterial the valuable uses of an information good—that is, the more
that the good can be deployed without necessary connection to identifiable
material goods —the less excludable it will be, under technological conditions
that make activities like mind reading, or surveillance of processes as opposed
to consumption or purchasing behavior, relatively difficult. To determine how
relatively immaterial the use of an information good is, in turn, we can ask
questions such as: Would infringement happen entirely inside someone's
head? If so, the good is highly immaterial. Would infringing the patent require
a nexus to a tangible good such as a pharmaceutical compound, a diagnostic
test, or a service provider? If so, its uses are less comprehensively immaterial in
the sense we mean here.'' Numerosity will also matter. The fewer possible
infringing parties there might be, the lower we would expect the cost of
detection and enforcement of patents to be.
Once the infiuence of technology, norms, and institutions is brought into
view, it becomes clear that patents do not and cannot, in a consistent or
symmetrical way, translate social value into private appropriability through the
mechanism of exclusion. Rather, all information goods will exist on an
excludability continuum. Those on the highly nonexcludable end of the
continuum represent a smaller ratio of social value that is privately
appropriable through IP rights. Those on the highly excludable end of the
continuum represent a correspondingly larger ratio of social value. We can
represent points on this continuum numerically: perfectly excludable goods
will exhibit a ratio of social value that is approaching one (assuming away, for
the moment, other forms of transaction costs that will reduce appropriability).
Perfectly nonexcludable information goods would exhibit a ratio approaching
59. In the classic economic sense, these information goods are all immaterial—what we mean to
idendfy here is the nature of the nexus that exists between the deployment or use of the
information, and materially controllable goods such as medicines, etc.
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zero, and highly nonexcludable information goods would exhibit what we can
call a "low" signaling ratio, i.e., where appropriability is a very small fraction of
social value.^°
I I . ILLUSTRATING THE THREE INFLUENCES ON EXCLUDABILITY
In the literature related to IP and health, there is a notable focus on one
particular Idnd of health intervention: pharmaceutical products (and, to a
lesser degree, on related technological interventions such as vaccines,
diagnostics, and medical devices). But many ldnds of information goods are
essential to health, including basic scientific information, epidemiological
information, understanding of the so-called "social determinants" of health,
information about effective medical techniques, and so forth.
One reason that the literature on health in the IP field may have focused so
much attention on pharmaceuticals and similar interventions is that they neatly
fit the exclusion-rights model of innovation.*' Medicines are highly excludable
under existing technological, normative, and institutional conditions. The
point may be immediately obvious to some, but it is worth explaining further.
Technically, the valued information good in the pharmaceutical context is not
the drug itself (which is a material, and not immaterial good), but rather
information about the drug—for example, its chemical structure and qualities.
60. We do not say that perfectiy nonexcludable goods would necessarily exhibit a ratio of zero,
but rather that their ratio would approach, or tend toward, zero. This distinction is in
recognition of the point that excludability is not the only means for private appropriation of
social value. As is well established in the innovation policy literature, there also exist
nonexclusionary market mechanisms — such as lead time advantages, high entry barriers,
branding, or bundled goods and services — that may often enable innovators to privately
capture some share of the social value of their innovation even in the absence of patent
rights or other exclusionary mechanisms. See sources cited infia note 61. Recognition ofthis
point, however, does not alter the general thrust of our argument. Even if an innovator of a
highly nonexcludable good is able to capture some share of its social value in the absence of
excludability, that share will remain lower than for an otherwise equivalent innovation that
may take advantage of both excludability and the alternative, nonexclusionary market
mechanisms. Thus, the gap in signaling ratios would remain.
61. Indeed, pharmaceuticals are frequentiy cited as perhaps the domain where patents function
best to induce information production. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al.. Appropriating the
Returns fiom Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
783, 817, 818 (1987); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT.
SCI. 173 (1986); Edwin Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and
Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907 (1981) ; Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson &
John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions arui Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
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its efficacy in treating particular diseases, and any side effects associated with
its use. Clinical trials are required to demonstrate safety and efficacy, and these
trials comprise the largest share—around sixty percent—of drug development
costs.*^ The generation of clinically verified knowledge on the properties of
dmgs is, then, a preeminent component of the innovative activity enabled by
patents in the context of pharmaceuticals.
But drug companies profit not by selling (intangible) information, but
rather by selling (tangible) dmgs. The link between tangible dmgs and
intangible pharmaceutical patents is a tight one, because vidthout the drug in
question, the intangible information is largely useless to patients. And drugs
are sold in a highly regulated context, in which a combination of
drug-regulatory laws, medical-licensing laws, customs enforcement, and health
insurance schemes all facilitate the enforcement of drug patents. The close link
between the intangible patented information and the tangible good of the
drug, along v̂ dth the broader institutional, technological, and normative
context, facilitates the use of exclusion rights to commodify by proxy the
critical health information generated in the pharmaceutical field.*'
62. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH EcON. 151, 165, 180-83
(2003) (estimating a total R8¿D cost per drug of $802 million, and clinical trial costs of $467
million per drug). Although there remains considerable controversy regarding the average
development costs of new drugs, with estimates varying from $250 million to $1.3 billion,
common to most such estimates is that expenditures on clinical approval constitute around
half of such costs. See, e.g.. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL RfidD:
COSTS, RISKS, AND REWARDS 48-72 (1993), http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9336.pdf;
PhRMA 2012 Industry Profile: Pharmaceutical Industry, PHARMACEUTICAL RES. &
MANUFACTURERS OF AM. 58 (2012), http://vifww.phrma.org/sites/defaulV'files/i59/phrma
_industry_profile.pdf. The controversies circle instead around issues such as the datasets on
which estimates are based (e.g., firms' self-reported figures versus audited data), the types
of drug development projects included (e.g., entirely new molecular entities or
improvements on existing products; entirely self-originated drugs or also those taken over
from federal or university labs), and the appropriate assumptions to adopt for costs of
capital and for risk. See, e.g., Donald W. Light, Misleading Congress About Drug Development,
32 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 895, 896-900 (2007) (criticizing DiMasi et al., supra); F.M.
Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 927, 928
(2004).
63. Notice, however, that there are normative constraints on patent enforcement in this context,
generated by moral arguments against the commodification of goods that are essential to
life. Pharmaceutical companies no longer enforce patents covering HIV/AIDS drugs as they
sought to earlier on in the AIDS epidemic. See, e.g.. Barton Gellman, A Conflict of Health and
Profit; Gore at Center of Trade Policy Reversal on AIDS Drugs to S. Africa, WASH. POST, May 21,
2000, at Ai; Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price Reductions, MÉDECINS SANS
FRONTIÈRES 11-12 (July 2012), http://wvirw.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets
/HIV_AIDS/Docs/AIDS_report_UTWi5_ENG_2oi2.pdf (detailing a range of voluntary
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Many other important kinds of health information, however, are much
more difficult to exclude. We highlight three here: negative information about
new medicines, lifestyle information and behavioral and structural
interventions to reduce cardiovascular disease (CVD), and basic techniques,
such as the hygiene checldist, to improve healthcare systems and quality.
A. Negative Information About Drugs
Our first and second examples both relate to the problem of CVD, so we
begin with a brief introducdon to this major public health concern. CVD refers
to a broad range of disorders affecting the blood vessels and heart, from
coronary heart disease and cerebrovascular disease to congenital and rheumadc
heart disease.*"* The consequences of these conditions are more familiar than
their proper names: CVD results in heart attacks, strokes, and high blood
pressure,*' and is the leading cause of death worldwide.** It is also the leading
cause of death in the United States, accounting for more than one-third of all
deaths each year.*^
A central concern in the fight against CVD is hypertension or high blood
pressure (HBP), a condition afflicting almost one in three Americans.*^
Although typically not the direct cause of serious symptoms, HBP is the most
important risk factor for the development of premature CVD.*' Litde wonder,
then, that keeping hypertension under control is a high public health priority.
Antihypertensive drugs play a large role in advancing this goal: over fifty-four
licensing schemes that characterize the global anti-HIV drug market, and the historical
impact this has had on medicine prices).
64. Fact Sheet No. 317: Cardiovascular Diseases (CVDs), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 2012),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs317/en/index.html.
65. WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL ATLAS ON CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE PREVENTION AND
CONTROL 2-3 (Shanthi Mendis, Pelcka Puska & Bo Norrving eds., 2011), http://whqlibdoc
.who.int/publications/2Oii/978924i564373_eng.pdf.
66. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE: 2004 UPDATE 8 (2008),
http://vsrww.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GBD_report_2004update_full.pdf.
The relative ranlcing of CVD as a worldwide health concern is diminished if the measure
used is "years of lost life," since CVD disproportionately affects older people. Id. at 21-22.
67. Heart Disease and Stroke Prevention: Addressing the Nation's Leading Killers, NAT'L CENTER
FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION 2 (2011), http://www
.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/aag/pd^2Oii/Heart-Disease-and-Stroke-AAG
-20n.pdf.
68. Véronique L. Roger et al.. Heart Disease and Stroke Statbtics — 2011 Update: A Report from the
American Heart Association, 123 CIRCULATION 459, ei8, eioi (2011).
69. Norman M. Kaplan, Cardiovascular Risks of Hypertension, UPTODATE, http://vTOrw.uptodate
.com/contents/cardiovascular-risks-of-hypertension (last updated Nov. 12, 2012).
1923
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 122:1900 2013
million Americans are taldng some Idnd of antihypertensive medication.''"
Of course, medicines do not only have good effects, but potentially bad
(side) effects as well. Moreover, to show that a medicine is effective against a
placebo is not to show that it is comparatively more effective than the leading
alternatives. Two important classes of information goods about drugs, then,
constitute what we call "negative" information: information that the drug is not
safe or efficacious, and information that it is comparatively less safe or
efficacious than other (particularly older and less expensive) alternatives.
Imagine that Jane develops a new antihypertensive medicine. To sell it, she
must meet FDA requirements and show that it is safe and efficacious. '̂ But
what if she suspects that the drug is rather less effective than the existing (and
generic, thus also less costly) BP-lowering medicine, or similarly effective but
less safe? She has no financial incentive to produce this information, because
she can only capitalize on her research investment by selling drugs, not by not
selling them. Her competitors may gain something from producing negative
information about her new drug, but the problem is a matter of degree. Jane
has more to gain by producing positive information about her drug than her
generic competitors have by producing negative information about her drug,
given the drastic differences in the markups they are able to charge and the
coordination difficulties that generic competitors face. Competitors with
patented drugs stand to gain more,̂ ^ but will still often have incentives that are
weak compared to Jane's. If there are multiple patented rival treatments, then
collective action problems exist as they do for generic competitors. If Jane has
but one rival, that rival's incentives will be more closely aligned with her firm's.
But that situation may be rare, and where it exists, there is still no guarantee
that negative information about Jane's drug will directly increase sales of the
competitor's drug. For example, if the two drugs are in the same class, negative
information about one may reflect badly on both.
This example is drawn from reality: from the early- to mid-1980s, a new
wave of antihypertensive drugs hit the market, and several quickly became top
sellers, including. Pfizer's calcium channel blocker Norvasc and leading
angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors from Merck and
70. Roger et al., supra note 68, at e2.
71. 21 U.S.C. §355(2006).
72. This is due to the fact that their rival products also enjoy a patent-enabled markup or
"quasi-rent." This difference between patented and generic compedtors in the asymmetry of
their incendves to generate negative information is an important way in which patents
exacerbate any existing market suboptimalities regarding the generation of negative
information.
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AstraZeneca.^' Meanwhile, an older hypertension treatment that had been
around for decades, generic diuretic pills, saw its share of hypertension
prescriptions fall substantially (from fifty-six percent in 1982 to twenty-seven
percent in 1993).'"* The cost differential between the drugs was significant: in
2002, the generic diuretics could be purchased for around $40, while the
newer, patented ACE inhibitors cost about $700." Though the newer drugs
rapidly began to displace the older ones, their comparative benefits were never
established. Only in 1995 did someone — specifically, the federal National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (part of the National Institutes of Health) —
study the issue with a head-to-head trial. Addressing these questions required a
high degree of statistical power,^* and accordingly the Institute's so-called
ALLHAT (Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart
Attack) study was the largest clinical trial of its kind to date, spanning eight
years and involving over 33,000 patients from 623 clinics.^
In 2002, the results of the ALLHAT study became clear. The newer
medicines were not significandy better than the older ones, and in some
respects they were worse.''^ The authors of the study thus concluded that
generic diuretics "should be preferred for first-step antihypertensive therapy,"^'
being "unsurpassed in lowering [blood pressure], reducing clinical events, and
73. MARCIA ANGELL, T H E T R U T H ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: H O W THEY DECEIVE U S AND
W H A T T O D O ABOUT IT 96-97 (2004); see, e.g, Jun Ma, Ky-Van Lee & Randall S. Stafford,
Changes in Antihypertensive Prescribing During US Outpatient Vbits for Uncomplicated
Hypertension Between içç3 and 2004,48 HYPERTENSION 846,848-49 (2006).
74. Teri A. Manolio et al.. Trends in Pharmacologie Management of Hypertension in the United
States, 155 ARCHATES INTERNALMED. 829, 829 (1995).
75. ANGELL, supra note 73, at 97.
76. Marvin Moser et al.. The ALLHAT Study Revüited: Do Newer Data from This Trial and Others
Indicate Changes in Treatment Guidelines?, 9 J. CLINICAL HYPERTENSION 372, 372 (2007).
77. ALLHAT Officers & Coordinators for the ALLHAT Collaboradve Research Grp., Major
Outcomes in High-Risk Hypertensive Patients Randomized to Angiotensin-Converting Enzyme
Inhibitor or Calcium Channel Blocker vs Diuretic, 288 JAMA 2981, 2981, 2983 (2002)
[hereinafter ALLHAT 2002]; see abo Moser et al., supra note 76, at 372 (nodng that
ALLHAT was "a landmark study, the largest hypertension study to date"); Richard J.
Rodeheffer, Editorial, Hypertension and Heart Failure: The ALLHAT Imperative, 124
CIRCULATION 1803, 1804 (2011) (stadng that ALLHAT was "a landmark clinical tdal in
hypertension management").
78. See ALLHAT 2002, supra note 77, at 2987; Moser et al., supra note 76, at 373-75. With respect
to certain outcomes, the diuretic outperformed the two leading newer drugs, resulting in an
almost forty percent lower dsk of heart failure than the calcium-channel blocker and in
fewer strokes and heart failure events than the ACE inhibitor (although faring no better
than the ACE inhibitor in terms of overall reducdon of CVD events). AT.THAT 2002, supra
note 77, at 2985-86; Moser et al., supra note 76, at 373.
79. ALLHAT 2002, supra note 77, at 2981.
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tolerability,"^" while also "superior in preventing l or more major forms of
CVD despite being less expensive."^' The ALLHAT results have been
corroborated by smaller-scale trials undertaken in Europe, some comparing
diuretics and calcium channel blockers head-to-head^^ and others in terms of
their respective results as compared to placebos,^' as well as in a 2011 ALLHAT
follow-up study. ̂ *
What could explain this multi-billion-dollar information failure ?̂ ^ The
concept of a continuum of excludability gives us critical purchase on the
problem. In a world where patents are the leading mechanism used to produce
information about drugs, there are asymmetrical incentives to provide positive
and negative information about new drugs. Positive information is easier to
render excludable than negative information, because of its closer nexus to a
tangible, physical product. A company that sought to profit from a patent on
negative information about a drug would need to track either thoughts or
abstention from purchasing. Even if monitoring such intangibles across a large
number of individuals were technically feasible, it is doubtful that such
monitoring would be economically viable and, in any event, it would bump up
against deeply entrenched privacy norms against invasive mental surveillance.
A patentee might instead seek to use circumstantial evidence, for example, a
switch between products or other uptalce of alternative treatment strategies.
80. Id. at 2994.
81. Id. at 2981; cf. Ron Winslow & Scott Hensley, Dose of Reality: Study Qrxestions High-Cost
Drugs for Hypertension, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2002, at Ai (quoting the Director of the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute as stating that "A[LLHAT] shows that diuretics
are the best choice to treat hypertension, both medically and economically").
82. Morris J. Brown et al.. Morbidity arui Mortality in Patients Randomised to Double-Blind
Treatment with a Long-Acting Calcium-Channel Blocker or Diuretic in the International
Nifedipine GITS Study: Intervention as a Goal in Hypertension Treatment (INSIGHT), 356
LANCET 366 (2000); Lennart Hansson et al., Randombed Trial of Old and New
Antihypertensive Drugs in Elderly Patients: Cardiovascular Mortality and Morbidity: The Swedbh
Trial in Old Patients with Hypertension-2 Study, 354 LANCET 1751 (1999).
83. See SHEP Coop. Research Grp., Prevention of Stroke by Antihypertensive Drug Treatment in
Older Persons with Isolated Systolic Hypertension, 265 JAMA 3255 (1991); Jan A. Staessen et al.,
Randombed Double-Blind Comparison of Placebo and Active Treatment for Older Patients with
Isolated Systolic Hypertension, 350 LANCET 757 (1997).
84. Linda B. Piller et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of Participants with Heart Failure in the
Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment To Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT), 124
CIRCULATION 1811 (2011).
85. The ALLHAT researchers estimated that "the health care system would have saved $3.1
billion in estimated cost of antihypertensive drugs" over the ten years between 1982 and
1992 if the switch to newer drugs had not been made. ALLHAT 2002, supra note 77, at 2994.
Of course, this figure does not incorporate the additional financial implications ofthe lesser
efficacy of newer antihypertensives.
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But such information could not reliably prove patent infringement absent a
new—and normatively unappealing—legal theory of infringement based on
indirect evidence of changes in individual consumption patterns. And this
strategy would also capture only a subset of foregone uses —those switching
away from the product-missing the many potential consumers of the product
who will not have been prior users. This mismatch illustrates one of the
analytic points made in more condensed form in Part I: negative information
about dmgs is very difficult to direcdy exclude, for reasons that can be
attributed to technology and norms.^*
Our hypothetical patent holder might also be able to employ other indirect
means of capitalizing on the negative information she has created, but all of
these strategies can appropriate at best a small portion of the social value at
stake. For example, one could imagine a "Consumer Reports" business model
in which firms profit from the sale of negative information about dmgs sold by
others. But the link between financial returns (for example via magazine sales)
and the social value of the information will be radically attenuated when
compared to the profits direcdy available from the sales of a patented drug.
Intermediaries such as insurance companies, for whom negative and
comparative information should be as valuable as positive information, are
subject to the classic constraints on information production in a competitive
market, and face collective action problems similar to those confronting generic
and patented drug competitors: vnthout an effective, excludable patent, a
company that invested millions of dollars in trials could expect to lose out to
competitors who would gain the advantage of the information but not bear its
cost of creation. Hospitals themselves might be able to recoup some of the
benefits of infections averted in the ICU, for example if they were able to
advertise their infection rates and attract new patients as a result. But because
they operate in (at least somewhat) competitive markets, they are likely to face
the same problems that insurance companies would.
Our argument, then, is not that absent a high degree of patent-related
excludability there will be no alternative market strategies or mechanisms for
private appropriation of some of the social value of an information good.
Rather, it is that the returns from such indirect, altemative mechanisms will
tend to be significandy lower than from direct, patent-based sales. Moreover,
when comparatively nonexcludable information goods must solely rely on such
indirect forms of appropriation or finance, they are fiirther disadvantaged
86. Institutional factors may also potentially play a role here. It is conceivable that all
consumption decisions would be made by one or a few highly visible organizations (such as
government purchasers, hospitals, or a small number of private insurers), which may then
be held to account more easily for the reasons underlying their shifting purchasing
decisions.
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vis-à-vis excludable information goods that can rely on both these alternatives
and on patent-based revenues.
JB. Lifestyle Interventions
Now consider a second example: the comparative implications of patents
for the development of medicines versus "lifestyle" interventions to address
CVD. The pharmaceutical approach to CVD risk reduction is a prominent one
in the United States: "statin" dmgs that reduce cholesterol are the top-selling
class of therapeutic drug.^'' Some have raised concerns that statins are
overprescribed.*^ A 2011 Cochrane Review (considered the gold standard in
meta-studies in the medical field) concluded that "[w]idespread use of statins
in people at low risk of cardiovascular events . . . is not supported by the
existing evidence,"*' while a recent update concluded instead that statins are
87. Top Therapeutic Classes by Prescriptions, IMS HEALTH (Apr. 7, 2011), http:/ /www
.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Conten1/Corporate/Press%20Room/Top-line%20Market%20Data
/20io%2oTop-line%2oMarket%2oData/20io_Top_Therapeutic_Classes_by_RX.pdf.
88. See J. Abramson & J.M. Wright, Are Lipid-Lowering Guidelines Evidence-Based?, 369 LANCET
168,168 (2007) (arguing that there is no clinical basis for the recommendation of statins for
primary prevention for women and people over sixty-five); Isabelle Savoiea & Arminee
Kazanjian, Utilization of Lipid-Lowering Drugs in Men and Women: A Refiection of the Research
Evidence?, 55 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 95, 95 (2002) (arguing similarly that statins have not
been shown to be beneficial for primary prevention in women and for the elderly, and
arguing that statin therapy should be focused on men with coronary heart disease).
89. Fiona Taylor et al.. Statins for the Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease (Review),
COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS. (2011), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
/doi/10.1002/14651858.CDoo48i6.pub4/pdf There are other meta-studies that come to the
conclusion that statins are helpful for primary prevention. See, e.g., C. Baigent et al.. Efficacy
and Safety of Cholesterol-Lowering Treatment: Prospective Meta-Analysis of Data from ço,os6
Participants in 14 Randomised Triab of Statins, 366 LANCET 1267 (2005); J.J. Brugts et al.. The
Benefits of Statins in People Without Established Cardiovascular Disease but with Cardiovascular
Risk Factors: Meta-Analysis of Randomised Controlled Triab, 338 BRIT. M E D . J. b2376 (2009) ;
Edward J. Mills et al.. Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Mortality and Events with Statin
Treatments: A Network Meta-Analysis Involving More Than 65,000 Patients, 52 J. A M . C .
CARDIOLOGY 1769 (2008). The Cochrane Review, however, expresses skepticism about these
studies because they tended to include trials that had a relatively high proportion of people
with established CVD, confounding their results. Taylor et al., supra, at 11. This raises a
concern we mention elsewhere, about the problems with relying on patent-holding firms to
fund studies to show that their drugs are ineffective for certain populations. As the
Cochrane Review notes, their research was made difficult by the fact that most studies did
not focus strictly on primary prevention; perhaps not coincidentally, including individuals
with secondary prevention needs would help ensure that a positive result could be shown.
The researchers were also unable to obtain data disaggregated in a way that would allow
independent analysis of the results of statins for particular subsets of patients. See id. at 11.
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likely beneficial in this population.'"
Debate, however, continues, despite significant investment by patent-
holding companies in studies to validate the use of statins for the vast
population of people at relatively low risk. A good example is the recent
JUPITER trial," which targeted a relatively low-risk group and had the
potential to boost sales of the AstraZeneca drug in question by $2 billion a
year.''' The trial did show some reduction in cardiovascular events and in
all-cause mortality;" however, it also showed an increased risk of diabetes,"^
so that "for every person who didn't get a serious cardiovascular event,
three-quarters of a person got diabetes."" The trial offers no evidence
regarding efficacy or safety beyond two years; because people may take these
drugs for decades, side-effects over longer time horizons remain a concern.'*
Moreover, the beneficial effects ofthe statin, while statistically significant, were
modest, such that "treating 120 people for 1.9 years with rosuvastatin (at a cost
of about $287,000) would prevent one cardiovascular event."'^ Concerns about
side effects and the expense of statins thus persist, leading to continued debate
about the benefits of statins for very low-risk individuals.
There are other approaches to reducing CVD risk, however. It is now well
lmown that unhealthy diets, lack of physical activity, and smoldng substantially
influence the risk of cardiovascular disease.'^ Evidence suggests that up to
one-third of all CVD deaths in the United States can be attributed to
smoldng." Those who are physically inactive increase their risk of CVD in a
90. Fiona Taylor et al.. Statins for the Primary Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease
(Review), COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS. (2013), http://onlinelibrary
.wiIey.com/d0i/10.1002/14651858.CD004816.pub5/pdf.
91. See Paul M. Ridker et al., Rosuvastatin To Prevent Vascular Events in Men and Women with
Elevated C-Reactive Protein, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2195, 2196 (2008).
92. Merrill Goozner, CRP-The Next Chapter in Medical Waste?, GOOZNEWS (NOV. 10, 2008),
http://gooznews.com/?p=i29i.
93. Ridker et al., supra note 91, at 2202.
94. Id. at 2205.
95. Goozner, supra note 92.
96. Ridker et al., supra note 91, at 2205.
97. Mardn Fenner, What Are the Right Numbers for JUPITER?, PLOS BLOGS: GOBBLEDYGOOK
(Nov. 23, 2008), http://blogs.pIos.org/mfenner/20o8/ii/23/what_are_the_right_numbers
_for_jupiter.
98. Fact Sheet No. 317: Cardiovascular Dbeases (CVDs), supra note 64.
99- U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., H O W TOBACCO SMOKE CAUSES DISEASE: THE
BIOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS FOR SMOKING-ATTRIBUTABLE DISEASE, A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 355 (2010), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/tobaccosmoke
/fijll_report.pdf.
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manner similar to those who smoke.'°° And numerous studies have found that
fish consumption reduces the risk of stroke.'"'
Behavioral interventions seek to reduce risk by affecting these habits,
typically through education and counseling. Structural interventions seek to
reduce CVD risk not by prescribing behavior changes for individuals, but by
altering the conditions in which individuals make choices about their behavior.
While a common behavioral approach would educate people about the benefits
of exercise, for example, a structural approach might instead redesign their
workplace to make exercise more attractive or endemic to daily life, or to
restrict their ability to smoke in public.'"^
Retrospective studies suggest that public health information and education
campaigns have had significant impacts on factors such as smoking rates, and
thus have reduced CVD, albeit indirecdy.'"' One recent study concluded, for
example, that "[s]moking rates have fallen by one-third since i960, and fat
intake has been reduced. These changes have occurred at least partly as a result
100. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PHYSICAL ACTIVITY AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 7 (1996), http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBHB.pdf.
101. See, e.g., Richard F. Gillum et al.. The Relationship Between Fbh Consumption and Stroke
Incidence: The NHANESI Epidemiologie Follow-Up Study, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 537
(1996) ; Sirving O. Keli, Edith J.M. Feskens & Daan Kromhout, Fbh Consumption and Risk of
Stroke: The Zutphen Study, 25 STROKE 328 (1994). But see, e.g., Martha Clare Morris et al.,
Fbh Consumption and Cardiovascular Dbease in the Physicians' Health Study: A Prospective
Study, 142 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 166 (1995) (failing to find a reladonship between fish
consumption and incidence of stroke). There is reason to be suspicious of the Morris study:
half of the patients in the study were taking aspirin, which could have attenuated the effects
of eadng fish. Hiroyasu Iso et al.. Intake of Fbh and Omega-3 Fatty Acids and Rbk of Stroke in
Women, 285 JAMA 304 (2001) (poindng out this Raw and finding an effect of fish intake
when aspirin use was accounted for, pardcularly for women). Several recent meta-analyses
have found a protective effect offish consumption. E.g., Rajiv Chowdhury et al.. Association
Between Fbh Consumption, Long Chain Omega 3 Fatty Acids, and Rbk of Cerebrovascular
Dbease: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 345 BRIT. MED. J. e6698 (2012); Susanna C.
Larsson & Nicola Orsini, Fbh Consumption and the Rbk of Stroke: A Dose-Response
Meta-Analysb, 42 STROKE 3621 (2011).
102. See K.M. Blankenship et al.. Structural Interventions: Concepts, Challenges and Opportunities for
Research, 83 J. URB. HEALTH 59 (2006); Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus, Dallas Swendeman &
Gary Chovnick, The Past, Present, and Future of HIV Prevention: Integrating Behavioral,
Biomédical, and Structural Intervention Strategies for the Next Generation of HIV Prevention,
5 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 143 (2009).
103. See, e.g., David M. Burns et al.. Cigarette Smoking Behavior in the United States, in
MONOGRAPH 8: CHANGES IN CIGARETTE-RELATED DISEASE RISKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL 13, 13 (David M. Burns, Lawrence Garfinkel &
Jonathan M. Samet eds., 1996), http://cancercontrol.cancer.gov/tcrb/monographs
/8/m8_2.pdf (showing sustained reductions in the per capita rates of cigarette smoking and
tobacco consumpdon from the 1950s onward); id. at 18 (concluding that health informadon
and public advertising likely caused some of the reducdon in smoking rates).
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of research findings relating them to health outcomes.'""'* But while there is
some evidence for the impact of such information, it remains clear that we need
better information, and better strategies for capitalizing on that information, to
reduce risks related to lifestyle factors. For example, much more data exists
about the health implications of heavy smoking than about so-called "social
smoking,"'"^ and there remain enormous unknowns in the science related to
dietary infiuences on health.'"^
This information gap relates to a broader problem: we often lack basic
epidemiological information that would help us understand the contemporary
incidence of disease. This issue is perhaps most easily illustrated in the context
of environmental toxins. In recent years, researchers have begun to consider
the possible role played by exposure to various "background" industrial and
synthetic chemicals in our environment (such as pesticides, petrochemicals,
industrial by-products, solvents, preservatives, plastics and heavy metals) in
contributing to rising rates of various medical conditions. And for a broad
range of diseases, they have found strong (albeit indirect) reasons to believe
that the role played by such exposure is considerable. This is because a large
proportion of current incidence rates for leading diseases remain unexplained
once known risk factors such as genetic disposition and lifestyle traits are
accounted for, leading researchers to focus on the potential contribution of
toxic exposure. Conditions believed to be so affected include CVD,'°^ breast
104. David M. Cutier & Srikanth Kadiyala, The Retum to Biomédical Research: Treatment and
Behavioral Effects, in MEASURING THE GAINS FROM MEDICAL RESEARCH: A N ECONOMIC
APPROACH n o , n o (Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel eds., 2010); see abo id. at 112
(summarizing evidence that "both medical treatments and behavioral changes are important
factors" in the two-thirds reduction in CVD between 1950 and 1994).
105. See Rebecca E. Schane, Pamela M. Ling & Stanton A. Glantz, Health Effects of Light and
Intermittent Smoking: A Review, 121 CIRCULATION 1518, 1518, 1520 (noting that the available
literature on the health effects of light and intermittent smoking is "not large" and that the
published cohort studies "lack a specific focus on intermittent smoking").
106. For example, there is significant debate and uncertainty about the relative benefits of, for
example, low-fat diets, "Mediterranean" diets (which have characteristics such as being rich
in vegetables, fish, and poultry), and low-carbohydrate diets. Reviews have suggested
benefits ofthe Mediterranean diet, but a recent (and rare) randomized t r ia l -which involved
only 322 subjects and followed them for just two years - suggested that a low-carbohydrate
diet may have the best effects for cholesterol, while the Mediterranean diet may be best for
those with diabetes. See Iris Shai et al.. Weight Loss with a Low-Carbohydrate, Mediterranean,
or Low-Fat Diet, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229 (2008); see abo Gina Kolata,
Experts Want More Studies of Diet's Role for the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2013,
http://virww.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/health/experts-want-m0re-studies-0f-mediterranean
-diets-role-for-the-heart.html (calling for more studies on alternative diets).
107. Timothy E. O'Toole, Daniel J. Conklin & Aruni Bhatnager, Environmental Risk Factors for
Heart Disease, 23 REVS. ENVTL. HEALTH 167, 167 (2008) (reviewing the evidence "linking
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cancer,'"^ childhood cancer,"" autism and other neurodevelopmental
disorders,"" type-2 diabetes,'" and obesity."^ In each instance, however, it is
environmental pollutants to cardiovascular disease (CVD)," finding that "[c]ollectively, the
data support the notion that chronic environmental stress is an important determinant of
CVD risk," and concluding that "[f]urther work is required to assess the magnitude of this
risk fully and to delineate specific mechanisms by which environmental toxins affect CVD").
108. An estimated seventy to eighty percent of breast cancer cases have no known cause. Task
Force on Cost-Effective Health Care Innovation, Valuing Health Care: Improving Productivity
and Quality, EwiNG MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND. 19 (Apr. 2012), http://www.kauffman.org
/uploadedfiles/valuing_health_care.pdf, while some estimate that a woman's lifetime risk of
contracting the disease has gone up from one in twenty in the 1960s to one in eight today.
Breast Cancer and Environment, BREAST CANCER ACTION, http://bcaction.org/our-take-on
-breast-cancer/environment (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). From this, some infer a strong role
for environmental toxins, although their contribution relative to diet and exercise as other
non-genetic risk factors remains a subject of considerable contention. Compare Karuna
Jaggar, Mammograms, Diet & Exercise Will Not End the Epidemic, THINK BEFORE You PINK
(Sept. 13, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://thinkbeforeyoupink.org/?p=i597 ("One of the ugly truths
of breast cancer is that more than half of all breast cancers have no known cause and
scientific evidence suggests that many cases are linked to exposure to environmental
toxins."), and Karuna Jaggar, Why We'll Never Underestimate Environmental Toxins,
BREAST CANCER ACTION (Sept. 14, 2011), http://bcaction.org/2011/09/14/why-well-never
-underestimate-environmental-toxins (asserting that notwithstanding "the known health
benefits of diet and exercise on reducing one's risk for breast cancer," "downplaying of the
connection between exposure to environmental toxins and increased risk of breast cancer"
risks "only addressing a part of the picture" by "keeping to just the narrow actions of
individuals"), with David Sampson, Breast Cancer: Just the Facts, AM. CANCER SOC'Y
PRESSROOM BLOG (Sept. 14, 2011), http://acspressroom.wordpress.com/2011/09/14/breast
-cancer-just-the-facts ("While it is true that most cases of breast cancer have no known
cause, the implication that exposure to environmental toxins is more important than diet
and exercise would be —at the very least —an exaggeration.").
109. Childhood cancers are the second leading cause of death among children age zero to fifteen,
and rose by approximately one percent per year from 1975 to 1998. Genetic predisposition is
estimated to account for as much as twenty percent of cases, leaving environmental factors
such as toxic exposure to take up between five and nine percent, depending on the cancer.
Tami Gouveia-Vigeant & Joel Tickner, Toxic Chemicals and Childhood Cancer: A Review
of the Evidence, LOWELL CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION 1 (May 2003),
http://viiww.sustainableproduction.org/dovw1loads/Child%20Canc%20Exec%20Summary.pdf.
110. Philip J. Landrigan, Luca Lambertini & Linda S. Birnbaum, A Research Strategy To Discover
the Environmental Causes of Autism and Neurodevelopmental Disabilities, 120 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. A258, A258 (2012) (noting the existence of "proof-of-principle" studies that "early
[toxic] exposures can cause autism," but acknowledging that "[a] major unanswered
question is whether there are still undiscovered environmental causes of autism or other
[neurodevelopmental disabilities] among the thousands of chemicals currently in wide use
in the United States").
111. Donald Sharp, Environmental Toxins, A Potential Risk Factor for Diabetes Among Canadian
Aboriginals, 68 INT'L J. CIRCUMPOLAR HEALTH 316, 316 (2009) (concluding that since
"[a]ccepted risk factors such as diet, lifestyle and genetics do not fully explain" a three
hundred to five hundred percent discrepancy in diabetes prevalence between the general
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also evident that although the contribution of environmental toxins to disease
rates seems potentially quite significant, investigations on this front are at a
very early stage, and substantially greater study is required before speciflc
linkages can be confidendy established. Producing good epidemiological
information about such chemicals is an enormous and expensive task,
especially in light of the number of chemicals involved and the fact that they
need to be studied in combination rather than isolation."'
To return to the heart disease context, we also know litde about how to
design interventions that vidll reliably change behaviors in low-risk individuals.
A recent Cochrane meta-study considered the impact of "healthy heart"
programs designed to reduce CVD risk by improving lifestyle.'"* Although the
selected trials did show beneflcial effects on risk-factors (including blood
pressure, smoking, and cholesterol), they did not show an effect on long-term
mortality, perhaps because people without established CVD have difficulty
maintaining behavior changes over the long term."'
population and indigenous peoples in Canada, the role of "environmental toxins
bioaccumulat[ing] in the food chain and . . . found in wild game and fish traditionally . . .
consumed by Aboriginal peoples" merits further study).
112. See, e.^., Juhee Kim et al.. Trends in Overweight from iç8o Through 2001 Among Preschool-Aged
Children Enrolled in a Health Maintenance Organization, 14 OBESITV 1107 (2006) (finding a
roughly four percent increase in obesity among children of all ages, including under six
months, from 1980 to 2001, perhaps raising the possibility of environmental factors
including toxic agents); Leonardo Trasande et al.. Environment and Obesity in the National
Children's Study, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 159,163 (2009) ("Because so few chemicals have
been tested for their toxicity, the possibility exists that other chemicals besides DES
infiuence somatic growth and obesity," but "[i]dentification of endocrine-disrupting
chemicals has been limited by the lack of toxicity testing data available for many chemicals
in widespread use.").
113. The following is a representative statement of the challenges in this area, from a review of
the existing state of evidence regarding childhood cancers:
It is difficult to determine the exact magnitude of the contribution of toxic
chemicals to the overall burden of childhood cancer. Because the majority
of chemicals in commerce — some of which are widely used in everyday
products — have not been studied for their potential to cause cancer, we do not
have a complete picture of the potential chemical causes of cancer in children. The
links with childhood cancer have been adequately studied for only a few
chemicals. Mixtures of chemicals mimicking the complex exposures that occur in
everyday life have been studied even less.
Gouveia-Vigeant & Tickner, supra note 109, at 3.
114. Shah Ebrahim et al.. Multiple Rbk Factor Interventions for Primary Prevention of Coronary
Heart Disease (Review), COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS. (2011),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.conv'doi/io.1002/14651858.CDooi56i.pub3/pdf
115. Id. at 1-2; iee abo Lawrence J. Appel, Lifestyle Modification: Is It Achievable and Durable?: The
Argument For, 6 J. CLINICAL HYPERTENSION 578, 578 (2004) (documenting die positive
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It is possible that we simply need better ideas about how to operationalize
the general knowledge that we have about the relationship of diet, exercise, and
smoking to CVD risk. Might there be ways, for example, to malee exercise more
sustainable by integrating it more fully into people's everyday lives? Perhaps
simply standing rather than sitting during meetings, or worldng at a standing
desk, could have effects similar to regular exercise."* Or perhaps researchers
could generate an exercise routine that could be done simply, at home for a few
minutes a day, and still achieve substantial reducdons in risk of CVD.
More promising, perhaps, are structural interventions to reduce CVD
risk."' For example, stair climbing is an excellent form of exercise, and it is one
that can be readily integrated into many people's daily lives."^ Unfortunately,
prevailing approaches to building design often malee stairs unappealing. A
different form of structural intervention whose beneficial effects have been
more robusdy documented are smoldng bans. Many studies in the United
States have now shown that comprehensive smoldng bans are associated with a
reduction in the incidence of heart attacks. For example, a recent study
documented the effects of Arizona's statewide smoking ban on a range of
effects of sustained lifestyle modifications on risk factors). Part of the problem may be
inadequate data. For example, of the fifty-five studies included in the Cochrane review, just
four were large enough to have the power to show possible effects on mortality. Ebrahim et
al., supra note 114, at 5. Another possibility is bias in the studies, which is difficult to
eliminate here, at least according to the convendonal gold standard of the randomized
controlled trial; researchers cannot blind people to whether they are receiving "lifestyle"
interventions. Id. at 2, 6. The nature of the intervendons studied undoubtedly varied
gready, given the wide parameters for behavioral intervendons that the review used. It is
possible that existing techniques could show mortality effects, but have not been studied at a
scale sufficient to prove this. Notably, researchers often express pessimism about the
possibility of such studies. See, e.g.. Appel, supra, at 583 ("Outcome studies have not been
done for nonpharmacological treatments [of high blood pressure], and probably never will
be . . . .").
116. Recent studies have begun to explore the implicadons of prolonged sitdng for health. See,
e.g.. Marc T. Hamilton, Deborah G. Hamilton & Theodore W. Zdedc, Role of Low Energy
Expenditure and Sitting in Obesity, Metabolic Syndrome, Type 2 Diabetes, and Cardiovascular
Dbease, 56 DIABETES 2655 (2007). For a study suggesdng the advantages of a standing desk
attached to a treadmill, see James A. Levine & Jennifer M. Miller, The Energy Expenditure of
Using a "Walk-and-Work" Desk for Office Workers with Obesity, 41 BRIT. J. SPORTS MED. 558
(2007).
117. The Cochrane "healthy heart" Review concluded that structural interventions are more
promising than behavioral ones. See Ebrahim et al., supra note 114, at 15.
118. See, e.g., Philippe Meyer, Bengt Kayser & François Mach, Stair Use for Cardiovascular Disease
Prevention, 16 EuR. J. CARDIOVASCULAR PREVENTION & REHABILITATION S17 (Supp. 2 2009).
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cardiovascular events.'" The result: "[T]here was a statistically significant
decrease in the number of acute myocardial infarction (AMI), angina, stroke,
and asthma cases admitted to hospitals in counties with no previous smoking
bans, compared with coundes with prior bans, during the months following
the implementation of the statewide comprehensive ban.'"" The reducdons
were impressive: the statewide ban in the no-earlier-ban counties led to 13%
fewer heart attaclcs, 33% fewer angina cases, 14% fewer acute stroke cases, and
22% fewer acute asthma cases.'" The researchers estimated the resuhing
reductions in hospitalization costs to be $16.8 million in the thirteen months
after the ban.'" Moreover, such interventions have few of what could be
considered negative side effects, apart from the possible hedonic costs for those
who have a taste for smoking in public.
To summarize the previous few pages of evidence about the existing state
of the field of primary prevention for CVD: millions of people take statin drugs
for primary prevention, but there is substandal debate about how well they
work, and when their benefits are outweighed by their side effects and cost.
We know that lifestyle changes, in contrast, could very substantially reduce the
burden of CVD, and producing and disseminating this information has led to
some significant health gains. But there is still much that we do not know
about lifestyle factors and health, and about how we can best translate the
knowledge we do have into sustained, widespread changes in diet, smoking,
and exercise pracdces.
Notice that patents operate asymmetrically with respect to the different
kinds of informadon goods diat might help reduce CVD. Positive informadon
about pharmaceudcals is on the highly excludable end of the continuum, for
reasons discussed above. But behavioral and structural approaches, and the
information that they draw upon, will typically be very difficult to exclude.
Imagine that a scientist who mapped the basic relationships between, say,
exercise and disease could obtain a patent on that cosdy information.
Commodifying this information nonetheless would be very difficult, as it
would require tracking of either the dissemination of the information itself, or
people's internalization of that information, or their response to it, including
everyday activides like walking, jogging, or joining a gym. Similarly, many
intervendons to help people adapt to a healthier lifestyle will also often be
119. Patricia M. Herman & Michèle E. Walsh, Hospital Admbsionsfor Acute Myocardial Infarction,
Angina, Stroke, and Asthma Afler Implementation of Arizona's Comprehensive Statewide Smoking
Ban, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 491 (2011).
120. Id. at 494.
121. W. a t494 tbl.i.
122. Id. at 495 tbl.2.
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difficult to exclude. Consider, for example, the obstacles you would face if you
held a patent on a method of reducing one's risk of heart disease by standing at
one's desk and walking during meetings. Enforcing a patent on a method of
improving cardiovascular health by banning public smoldng would present
different problems. The patent holder would have to threaten lawsuits against
states for adopting her novel legislative approach. Such lawsuits would have
many impediments, including the constitutional question of states' sovereign
immunity.'^' Such obstacles are illustrative of the ldnds of normative and
technical hurdles that a hypothetical inventor would face. Consequently, we
should not be surprised if we see-as we have recently-significant private
sector investment intended to increase the pool of people eligible for treatment
with statins, but see very litde private sector investment in efforts to
understand basic epidemiological linlcs between diet, smoking, exercise, and
CVD, or to develop and prove the efficacy of new ways to make exercise
endemic to the workplace.
Again, in both cases, inventors might find more indirect ways to profit
from their inventions, short of patent enforcement. Exercise gurus can produce
copyrighted books and DVDs, for example, but these would offer a far smaller
possibility of recouping the social value produced by the invention (along with
the far more expensive and critical evidence validating the extent to which the
invention effectively works to reduce morbidity and mortality) than would an
enforceable patent. Copyright law could be strengthened, but it could not be
extended to protect facts or ideas —such as the functional aspects ofthe exercise
regime itself or the fact that it reduced mortality—without dramatic revision in
its structure.'^ Moreover, a hypothetical copyright holder seeking to enforce a
copyright on not simply expressions but also ideas would run up against the
same nonexdudability problems that our hypothetical patent holder would
encounter.
The point is not that there could be no way to profit from research and
validation activities associated with behavioral or structural interventions to
reduce CVD risk. Instead, it is clear that the ability ofthe producers ofthis kind
123. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S . 627, 645-48
(1999) (finding that the Patent Remedy Act was not a valid waiver of state sovereign
immuni ty) . Patent holders could sue to enjoin states from continuing to practice the patent,
however. Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No . 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2006) ("[C]ont inuing prospective violations of a federal patent right by state officials may
be enjoined by federal courts under the Ex parte Young doctrine . . . . " ) .
124. See 17 U.S.C. § iO2(b) (2006) (denying protection to any "idea" or "procedure, process,
system, [or] method of operation"); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nat ion Enters. , 471
U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (" [N]o author may copyright facts or ideas."); Baker v. Seiden, 101 U.S .
99 (1879) (articulating the idea-expression dichotomy).
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of health information to recoup the social value that they create, even if entided
to a patent, is very limited. And it is certainly much more limited than the
ability of, say, a company that develops and sells statins, for reasons that have
to do ultimately with the influence of technology and norms on the ease and
cost of exclusion.
C. Innovations in Healthcare Quulity
We now turn to a third example of a difficult-to-exclude information good,
one that helps to highlight the infiuence of institutional context on the
continuum of excludability. As previewed in the Introduction, hospitals and
other health care settings are frequent sites of dangerous infection.'^' These
infections can be lethal, particularly when they are antibiotic resistant.'"* One
way to address them is by investing hundreds of millions of dollars, or even
billions of dollars, in new and improved antibiotics.'^^ Another is to improve
the quality of preventive care in the hospital.
The checldist technique described above is a quality innovation, one first
developed and tested locally by a doctor specializing in critical care at Johns
Hoplcins, Peter Pronovost. Although it is a complex intervention, the checldist
technique clearly qualifies as an information good, and it required a nontrivial
investment of time and resources to develop and validate. As with drug
development, much of the cost was in the validation. Although Pronovost
documented very good results in initial implementation at Johns Hopkins,
many were skeptical that the remarkable reduction in infection rates he
achieved there could be replicated in less well-resourced, receptive
environments.'^^ A randomized controlled clinical trial was thus needed to
demonstrate the applicability and efficacy of the technique. And it showed
remarkable success: the technique reduced the median quarterly rate of
central-line catheter infections by sixty-six percent.'"' This rate was sustained
during sixteen to eighteen months of follow-up studies,''" and was estimated to
save more than 1,800 lives and $200. million over a three-year period in
125. R. Monina Klevens et al.. Estimating Health Care-Associated Infections and Deaths in U.S.
Hospitals, 2002,122 P U B . H E A L T H R E P . 160,160 (2007).
126. Elixhauser & Steiner, supra note 2, at 1-2.
127. For one proposal in this direction, see Sonderholm, supra note 3, at 241-42 (proposing a
reward for new antibiotics in the form of a tradable patent- term extension, at a cost of about
$2 billion per new antibiotic).
128. A T U L GAWANDE, T H E CHECKLIST M A N I F E S T O : H O W T O G E T T H I N G S R I G H T 40-44 (2009).
129. Pronovost et al., supra note 1, at 2725.
130. Id. at 2731.
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Michigan alone.''' On a national scale, the savings could be up to 15,000 lives
and $1 billion in treatment costs each year.''^
As noted earlier, by any measure of social welfare, the checklist technique is
a great intervention. And although it was not cosdess to develop, it was
relatively inexpensive. The foundational research at Johns Hopkins and in
Michigan was paid for by the Eederal Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, at a cost of just $1 million."^ The intervention looks even better when
we compare it to the estimated price of treating central-line catheter infections
(an average cost as high as $45,000 per infecdon),'^ or developing new
antibiotics to better treat these infections (in the hundreds of millions, if not
billions of dollars).
As good as the intervention is in public health terms, however, it is
relatively undervalued by a system that allocates research dollars according to
appropriability. Assume, for a moment, that the checklist technique meets the
standards of patentability—perhaps Pronovost could claim "a process for
reducing central-line catheter infections in the ICU, comprised of the use of a
[checklist, personnel management intervendons, monitoring, etc.]."''' With a
131. Preventing Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infections: A Global Challenge, A Global
Perspective, T H E J O I N T C O M M I S S I O N , at x (May 2012), h t tp: / /www.jointcommission
.or¿ ' 'assets/ i / i8/CLABSI_monograph.pdf
132. SURVEY OF STATE HOSPITAL ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 8, at 2.
133. Id. at 9.
134. Pronovost et al., supra note l, at 2726 (citing an average per patient cost of $45,000). There
is a markedly wide range of estimated treatment costs, bu t reasonable estimates range from
$10,000 to $50,000 depending upon how costs are measured, the patients involved, the
hospital in question, and so forth. See, e.g., Justin B. Dimick et al.. Increased Resource Use
Associated ivith Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infection in the Surgical Intensive Care Unit, 136
ARCHIVES SURGERY 229, 231-33 (2001) (calculating the total increase in hospital costs for
each infection in critically ill patients at over $50,000); David K. Warren et al.. Attributable
Cost of Catheter-Associated Bloodstream Infections Among Intensive Care Patients in a
Nonteaching Hospital, 34 CRITICAL CARE M E D . 2084, 2084 (2006) (finding an attributable
cost of $11,971 per infection).
135. In fact, similar patents, some of which cite Pronovost's work, are not hard to find. See, e.g.,
U.S. Patent No. 7,991,625 (filed May 31, 2006) (claiming a "[sjystem for providing expert
care to a basic care medicad facility from a remote location"); U.S. Patent No. 7,433,827 (filed
Feb. 18, 2005) (claiming a "[sjystem and method for displaying a health status of
hospitalized patients," wherein "[ijnformation concerning the latest care and practice
standards for a given condition is provided to a decision support module," which
"comprises decision support algorithms that reflect a standardize[d] guideline of practice for
a particular medical condition"). The recent Bibki line of subject matter cases might
complicate matters for patents such as these. See Bilslti v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
(affirming that "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" are ineligible
general categories for patent protection, and specifically holding that a mathematical
formula for hedging risks, and its application to energy markets, are patent-ineligible
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patent in hand, Pronovost would nonetheless have difficulties detecting
infringers. These efforts would likely require substantial surveillance or
investigation, in part because there is no tangible product in which the
information is embodied from which hospitals can be excluded or, more
importandy, from which hospital use of the underlying information good can
be discerned. Norms disfavoring proprietary rights over medical techniques-
evidenced by the statutory bar on the enforcement of patents on surgical
techniques''*-might also generate an additional "cost" of enforcement
(reputational or other social sancdons, reluctance to cooperate with
investigations, etc.). In this type of scenario, technology and norms work
against the enforcement of any such patent in ways similar to the two other
cases discussed above.
But Pronovost has one salient advantage when we compare his technique to
the lifestyle interventions or negative information on existing drugs discussed
above: there are a limited number of ICUs in the country, and they are sizable
players who cannot easily hide.'" They are also bureaucratized, in part because
the surrounding legal and regulatory environments require a certain level of
monitoring and oversight. That in turn creates the possibility of a paper trail,
reducing the evidentiary costs of enforcement to Pronovost. Regulatory forces,
such as tort law or medical licensing and review boards, might also intervene
effectively to require or produce prima facie evidence that hospitals used
Pronovost's approach once it becomes the standard of care, again diminishing
evidentiary and surveillance costs.
We should not overstate the case. Although the institutional context would
make this setting easier to surveil, some detective work would be required,
making enforcement still more cosdy than it would be if there were a tangible
commodity associated with the patent. A hospital threatened with an
"abstract ideas"); see abo Mayo Collaboradve Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012) (invalidadng, under the "laws of nature" exclusion, patent claims that involved
administering a drug, measuring the level of certain metabolites in a padent's blood, and
deducing from this level whether the dosage was correct); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissendng fiom dismissal of
certiorari as improvidendy granted) (contending that the drawing of a correladon between
elevated levels of an amino acid in the blood and vitamin deficiency is an unpatentable
"mental process"). Pronovost could also face substandal challenges on the obviousness
front, but we set these issues aside for the moment to consider the dilemmas Pronovost
would face even in the presence of a patent.
136. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2006).
137- There are between five and six thousand hospitals in the United States, and not all
of these will have an ICU. See Past Facts on US Hospitab, AM. HOSP. ASS'N,
http://vifww.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml (last updated Jan. 3, 2013)
(cidng close to six thousand registered hospitals in the United States).
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infringement lawsuit would presumably discount the threat according to the
difficulty or expense of discovery and burden of proof that Pronovost would
face, the odds that it could escape liability on a theory of non-infringement,
and so forth. Indeed, norms against enforcing patents in a surgical ward might
lead them simply to ignore potential patent issues-as many universities
reportedly continue to do even after the Madey v. Duke University'^^ decision
indicated that their internal, noncommercial uses of patented inventions were
potentially infringing.''' Even if Pronovost could extract a licensing fee by
sending off a series of registered letters, that fee would be reduced according to
the payers' perceptions of the strength of his legal claim and the costs to him of
proving his case.
Although norms and technology make the checklist technique somewhat
difficult to exclude, the institutional context improves the oudook for
Pronovost and puts this intervention somewhere in the middle of our
continuum of excludability. However, the fact that the checldist holds out a
comparatively lower ratio of private appropriability may disadvantage it against
more excludable, but less socially valuable, alternatives.
Of course, as with our other examples, here too Pronovost could seek to
appropriate some of the value of his invention via means more indirect than a
patent. He could create a certification mark, and offer hospitals a "quality seal
of approval" for a fee, using trademark law and advertising to recoup some of
his expenses. He might offer to serve as a consultant for hospitals, helping to
tailor the intervention to local contexts. He could write and sell copyrighted
manuals about how to implement the approach.
Similarly, one can also imagine that hospitals have some strategies of
appropriation-direct cost savings or reputational gains, for example-that
might sustain investment into quality-improving techniques. But the cost to
the hospitals of such infections is a small part of their total cost. Indeed,
because hospitals tend to charge on a fee-for-service model, they may have
138. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
139. John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters: Material
Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomédical Research, 36 RJES. POL'Y 1184, 1200 (2007)
(reporting a 2004 survey finding that patents did not deter university researchers) ; see abo
John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and
Licensing on Biomédical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285,
324-27 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al.. Effects]
(reporting that university researchers "roudnely ignor[e] IP rights" and that infringement is
"pervasive") ; Crisdna Weschler, Note, The Informal Experimental Use Exception: University
Research Afler Mdidey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1536, 1552-63 (2004) (describing
the norms that allow university researchers to infringe patents). Part of the reason that
university scientists may ignore patent issues may be the apparent norm against filing suit
against university researchers. See Walsh et al.. Effects, supra, at 325-28.
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perverse incentives. Healthcare professionals who are compensated for
providing particular services are likely, all other things being equal, to provide
too many of those services —too many tests and interventions, for example.'"*" If
healthcare providers were paid according to the number of infections averted,
rather than the drugs they provided, they would have more rational incentives
to avert infections. However, although the fee-for-service model likely
exacerbates the difficulty, the problem of misaligned innovation incentives is
not reducible to it. Assume that hospitals invariably earn much more from
averting infections than from treating them. A hospital that wishes to develop
an information good to help reduce infections still faces the conventional
information good problem, and is situated similarly to the insurance
companies discussed in the context of negative information on drugs. A
hospital that invested significant sums in a highly nonexcludable solution
might well be unable to recoup its costs if others could freely copy its
invention. And it would have greater incentives to produce more excludable
interventions to reduce infections (e.g., technological ones) than to produce
less excludable interventions (e.g., checklists), because producing the former
would provide them with more effective exclusion rights and thus greater
returns on their initial investments.
Although our three public health examples vary along numerous
dimensions —including the types of innovative activity that may lead to their
generation and the reasons for their high nonexdudability-they all have in
common three crucial characteristics: (l) they are "innovations" in the specific
sense of being cosdy-to-generate information goods; (2) they potentially offer
very large social benefits net of their costs of generation in the form of
improved health outcomes and reduced health-related expenditures; and
(3) they will remain highly nonexcludable even with the availability of patent
entitlements, resulting in a comparatively low signaling ratio. As a result, a
system that relies on private appropriation as an incentive will not prioritize
their development, and, as we now explain, -mil actively work against them in
certain respects.
140. See, e.g., Mireille Kingma, Can Financial Incentive Influence Medical Practice?, 3 WORLD
HEALTH ORG. HUM. RESOURCES DEV. J., no. 2, 2005, at 8, http://www.who.int
/hrh/en/HRDJ_3_2_O5.pdf (reviewing the literature and finding a "consensus" that "doctors
in such [fee-for-service] systems tend to generate more work (e.g. consultations,
prescription items, surgical interventions) than those in other payment structures"); Merrill
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I I I . EXPLANATORY AND POLICY SIGNIFICANCE
What implications can we draw for innovation theory and policy from the
continuum of excludability and from the existence of highly nonexcludable
information goods of the sort just canvassed? Perhaps the most ñindamental
conclusion is that a patent system will predictably and systematically distort
private investment decisions regarding innovation, overstating the value of
highly excludable information goods and understating the value of highly
nonexcludable ones. As a result of these distortionary effects, patents will fail to
provide sufficient private returns to enable investment in certain information
goods that clearly offer a net social benefit. Indeed, the valuable innovations
neglected by patents will in some cases be comparatively more valuable than the
ones patents do incent. Finally, increases in patent protection will tend to
exacerbate these distortions Ijy channeling ever more resources toward
comparatively less valuable (but more excludable) innovations and away from
an increasingly larger domain of highly valuable, less excludable ones.
Below we elaborate on these effects and draw out their implications for the
conventional theory of patents, for patent and innovation policy, and for
debates about information policy.
A. The Potential Distortions of Patents
An optimally efficient system of innovation incentives would provide
signals to private parties regarding the expected returns from innovative
activity that direcdy tracked the underlying social value of the activity. Patents,
however, link the expected private returns not to social value simpliciter, but
rather to the portion of social value that can be effectively (or cheaply)
extracted through the exercise of exclusionary rights. But there is no reason to
think that variations in the ease or costs of exclusion are correlated -with the
underlying social value of different information goods. Reasoning in ideal
terms, patents will drive innovative effort and investments away from an
optimally efficient allocation providing the greatest net social value and instead
toward information goods that may provide lower net social value but higher
private value owing to lower costs or barriers to effective excludability :
There are two distinct kinds of ideal-type distortion at issue here. The first
type refiects the fact that there are some highly nonexcludable goods whose
development a patent system will fail to incentivize because the private returns
appropriable using patents remain lower than the private costs of creation or
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validation of the good."*' To be sure, it is to some extent a familiar point that
patents will only incentivize a subset of the universe of net-beneficial
innovations. As others have observed, transaction costs and other barriers to
perfect price discriminadon and tailored licensing mean that a patent system
viáll fail to produce some net-beneficial innovations because some of the social
surplus from innovations will go uncaptured by the private innovator (with the
innovator's share further reduced by the limited duration of patent protection,
etc.)."*^ This claim is an extension of the point recognized above-that patents
do not yield perfect appropriability because of limits on their scope, duration,
and so forth. And indeed an "optimizing" response has developed in the
literature; that theory urges the creation of ever more expansive, flne-tuned
property rights, so as to capture all net-beneficial innovations in pursuit of a
global optimum.'*' Our point, however, is different in two respects.
A first difference lies in the divergent prescriptions that these two
arguments recommend. Eor highly nonexcludable goods, the standard
"optimizing" response to the transaction cost problem-namely, to increase the
strength of patent protection or the ability of patentees to extract a greater
share of the surplus from transactions-will be ineffectual in remedying the
underlying skew between social value and private appropriability. In fact, this
intervention vidll have the opposite effect: strengthening patent rights viáll
further distort the signal that exclusion rights transmit to make relatively
excludable goods still more appealing targets of investment in comparison to
relatively less excludable goods (as discussed below). Importandy, the features
that make patents ineffectual at inducing the creadon of highly nonexcludable
goods do not apply to other institutional approaches to innovation. That is, if
the government funds the creadon of an information good such as a checklist
(as it in fact did in our example), the innovation can be distributed without
exclusion and thus without the need to confront the normative, technological,
and institutional barriers to the enforcement of exclusion rights.
A second, somewhat subder, difference between the transaction-cost
problem and our argument lies in the force of our claim not only for
141. This will be the case for goods that are very valuable in comparison with their cost, but
where the fraction of social value that an innovator can recover ( a ) is very low. It will also be
the case where the fraction is higher, but the goods are only somewhat more valuable than
their cost. In other words, if a = 0.01, a good that costs less than $1 million will not be
created even if it generates social returhs of $100 million. If a = 0.5, a good that generates
$10 million of value will be created if it costs $1 million, but not if it costs more than $5
million.
142. See, e.g., Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 41; Griliches, supra note 41; Mansfield et al.,
iupra note 41.
143. See sources cited supra note 45.
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optimizing but also non-optimizing views. For non-optimizers, the fact that
patents will fail to incentivize all net-beneficial innovations is less concerning
so long as we can assume that the innovations we obtain from a patent system
will tend, as a whole, to be more beneficial than the ones we forego. And that
standard assumption is appropriate if patents operate symmetrically on all
kinds of information goods (that is, if symmetric transaction costs are the main
problem with recouping value) ; if that is so, then at any given level of patent
protection, the innovations that are incentivized will be those with a higher
ratio of (privately appropriable) social value to private costs."*^ But where the
constraints on private appropriation are not symmetrical across categories or
types of innovation—as is the case for highly nonexcludable information
goods —then some innovations that go under-incented may hold out greater
ratios of social value to cost. It is easy to imagine, for instance, that there may
be unincentivized lifestyle interventions that are not only net beneficial, but
more beneficial than an incentivized statin drug (because the intervention is
cheaper or generates more social value, or both). For such cases, alternative or
supplemental innovation approaches will not just increase the overall amount
of valuable innovations that we are able to obtain as long as we are willing to
devote more social resources to this sector; they also hold out the promise of
improving the efficiency of expenditures even if we keep them at the existing
level. Shifting some resources from the patent system to alternatives will
provide a greater welfare "bang for our buck."
If we wish to realize the social benefit from these highly nonexcludable
innovations that remain unprofitable even under a patent system, then we
must pursue alternative innovation policies, such as prizes, public funding, or
commons-based approaches. Critically, the problem of nonexcludability points
to a domain of innovation that patents, whatever their scope, cannot
adequately address. And this holds even if our focus is not on more upstream
or basic research, but rather solely on downstream or direcdy implementable
interventions. Even for the latter, we cannot conclude that the most efficient
system of innovation could rely solely on exclusion rights. This necessity of
supplementing patents with some alternative policies has a pointed implication
for innovation policy analysis that bears emphasizing. Any policy, such as
prizes or public funding, that would generate more valuable, highly
nonexcludable innovations than patents would not merely supplement the
patent system, but would, at least in this respect, outperform it. This particular
superiority should then be added to our understanding of the virtues of
nonexclusionary approaches to innovation. Of course, nonexclusionary
144. See Alan V. Deardorff, Should Patent Protection Be Extended to All Developing Countries?,
13 WORLD ECON. 497,504-05 (1990).
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approaches have many possible disadvantages, too. Nothing we say here, for
example, contradicts the concern that governments may malee wasteful
investments or may be susceptible to inappropriate infiuences. V^en deciding
on the proper mix of institutional approaches, these possible costs must be
weighed against the possible benefits — benefits that now must be understood
to include the ability to generate investment in highly nonexcludable goods.
Precisely this sort of comparative-institutional approach was what Demsetz
advocated in his original articulation of the allocative case for patents, when he
cautioned against the "nirvana fallacy" of evaluating the actual operation of one
system against an ideal version of another.'*^ Yet, the continuum of
excludability reveals that the allocative case for patents is itself premised
on a flawed idealization: that of a one-to-one relationship between
property/exclusion rights and private appropriability of market value.
Correcting for this fiaw boosts the comparative case for alternatives to
patents-or, more precisely, the case for a broad ecology of innovation policies
that includes a significant, expanded role for other institutional approaches.
A second type of potential distortion is presented by the fact that patents
may not only fail to incentivize some net-beneficial goods, but also
affirmatively jeopardize the creation of such goods by diverting resources away
from them.'** Consider again a lifestyle intervention that is more net beneficial,
but less excludable, than a statin drug. At some low level of patent protection,
it may be the case that the lifestyle intervention holds out greater private
returns than the less valuable drug, and the returns are sufficient to recoup the
capitalized costs of developing and validating the intervention. However, as
patent protection increases, the private appropriability from the drug may
increase to a point that it becomes the more profitable project. And, assuming
increasing costs of capital (i.e., an upward-sloping supply curve for investment
dollars), it may crowd out the lifestyle intervention entirely.''*''
The point generalizes : each time we increase the level of patent protection
145. See Demsetz, supra note 13, at 3.
146. For related arguments, see Fisher, supra note 10, at 169; Lunney, supra note 20, 492-98; and
Plant, supra note 20, at 38-43.
147. It bears emphasizing a difference between our argument for patents' distordonary,
crowding-out effect and those of the predecessor scholars cited in note 146, supra. Our
assumption of increasing capital costs is weaker than the premises upon which prior
treatments have been based, such as patents providing "monopoly" returns, see Plant, supra
note 20, at 51, or innovators having only imperfect access to capital markets, see Lunney,
supra note 20, at 486. For further discussion of the significance of these differences for
analysis of the interaction between intellectual property rights and market structure, see
Oren Bracha & Talha Syed, Beyond the Incentive-Access Paradigm? Product Differentiadon
and Copyright Revisited (Feb. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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provided, we may correspondingly increase the risk that some additional,
highly valuable innovations will be squeezed out. Valuable but nonexcludable
innovations may become increasingly less comparatively profitable and thus
sidelined for the sake of more profitable but less valuable projects involving
more excludable outputs. We cannot be certain, then, that the creation of even
a modest level of patent protection improves the allocation of resources for
innovation—although it perhaps remains plausible. We can be rather less
assured that enhanced levels of patent protection, contra the optimizing
tradition, promise an ever greater approximation of allocative efficiency in the
channeling of innovation resources (whatever its other drawbacks).
Taking stock, we see that patents will undersupply some very valuable
innovations: those that are highly nonexcludable. Further, the innovations that
patents neglect will sometimes be more valuable than the ones they incentivize.
Finally, increasing patent protection can exacerbate these distortions, diverting
greater amounts of resources toward comparatively less valuable (but more
excludable) innovations at the expense of more valuable ones.
This problem of marginalizing nonexcludable innovations becomes still
more acute once we recognize that this bias can become entrenched. Two
mechanisms of entrenchment are possible. First, we can expect those who
specialize in the use of exdusive rights to recoup their investment to exhibit
competitive hostility to inventions that solve the same problem through
nonexcludable means."** One form such conduct may take is familiar from the
literature on rent seeking and capture:'"" those whose business models rely
148. One recent illustration of such competitive hostility comes from a case paralleling in some
respects our diuretic example: it has long been understood that a low-dose regimen of
(off-patent, cheap) aspirin is as or more effective than many more expensive patented
treatments in reducing secondary incidence of heart attacks and strokes. Over the past
decade, however, concerns have arisen that a significant segment of the population,
estimated to be anywhere from five to forty percent, is resistant to such treatment. Yet a
recent study by university-based researchers (partiy publicly funded) concluded that when
uncoated aspirin is used, not one incidence of "aspirin resistance" could be found among a
sample size of four hundred patients. Tilo Grosser et al.. Drug Resistance and
Pseudoresistance: An Unintended Consequence of Enteric Coating Aspirin, 127 CIRCULATION 377
(2013). The rise of "aspirin resistance," despite its apparent dearth of evidential support, has
been attributed by some, including "prominent doctors," to "the prevalence ofthe condition
[being] exaggerated by companies and drug makers with a commercial interest in proving
that aspirin — a relatively inexpensive, over-the-counter drug whose heart benefits have
been known since the 1950s — does not always work." Katie Thomas, Study Rabes Questions
on Coating of Aspirin, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2012, http://vifVifw.nytimes.com/2012/12/05
/business/coating-on-buffered-aspirin-may-hide-its-heart-protective-effects.html.
149. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, T H E CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs
of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
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heavily on exclusionary rights that generate rents will predictably spend
resources devoted to obtaining favorable laws that maintain or expand these
exclusionary rights. Additionally, investors in more excludable innovations can
be expected to be directly hostile to alternative approaches, such as proposals to
invest government fimding in highly nonexcludable solutions. The greater the
asymmetry in profitability from excludable goods as opposed to nonexcludable
goods, the more an innovation system that includes property rights as a major
component can be expected to tilt toward excludable solutions over time.
Second, if institutions and individuals exist in social and cultural contexts
that shape their ideas about where solutions are likely to be located, as we think
they do, then as nonexcludable approaches repeatedly lose out to excludable
ones, the process can be expected to shape deeper understandings and
orientations of actors in the field. The ideas of researchers, doctors, patients,
advisory boards, policymakers, etc., regarding what sorts of problems are most
salient or worth pursuing and what kinds of solutions or interventions are
paradigmatically "viable" or available may all be subtly shaped over time.
Moreover, not only may each choice of pro-excludability approaches provide a
piecemeal nudge that fiirther acculturates actors in that direction, but a
successive series of such choices may "snowball" so as to accelerate the
entrenchment of certain frames of reference, forging deep, path-dependent
grooves.
This last point provides a partial response to skeptics who might argue that
some of the examples we have chosen—for example, of the apparent
overinvestment in medicines and concomitant underinvestment in lifestyle
interventions - are more likely to reflect genuine preferences of individuals
than to offer examples of systemic distortion. Our argument does not turn on
the success of the particular examples we have chosen, but this skepticism
usefixlly permits us to illustrate the problem of path dependence. It may be that
individuals appear to "prefer," under existing conditions, to talce a pill rather
than adopt a new exercise regime, but this may be because they have
preexisting ideas about the likely benefits and experience of pharmaceuticals
over exercise that are shaped by an environment that over-promotes the former
and under-innovates in the latter.
The dynamics of such a process would help to explain what many in the
fields of medicine and public health have bemoaned for years: an excessive
focus on technological fixes to our nation's healthcare challenges, often labeled
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971); Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking,
in 7 THE NEW PALGRAVB DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 95 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E.
Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). For applications of public choice analysis to legislative activity
concerning intellectual property rights, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987).
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an "overmedicalization" of society.''° By analyzing how the continuum of
excludability interacts with an institutional ecology that heavily emphasizes the
role of patents in biomédical research and development, we provide analytic
grounding for a central theme in this literature: the increasing emphasis
on, or even preoccupation vidth, technologically embodied, commodifiable
approaches to health and well-being and the devaluing of lifestyle or stmctural
interventions, as well as of the etiological role of social factors. We have already
touched upon two of the most commonly identified aspects of this process: an
increased reliance on the development and use of new drugs, even in the face of
inconclusive or negative data on their comparative safety or efficacy, and a
corresponding tendency to sideline nontechnological interventions, such as
those targeting lifestyle factors like diet and exercise.
Our analysis also helps account for an additional, related theme, one central
to the fields of public health and epidemiology over the last two to three
decades. This is concern over the predominance of a "biomédical model"
that foregrounds the role in illness and health of physiological and other
individual-level factors, and does so at the expense of infrastructural and
institutional factors focused on by a "social epidemiology" lens.'^' These
factors, commonly grouped under the label "social determinants" of health,
include socioeconomic status, gender roles and relations, racial stratification,
workplace organization and hierarchies, public infrastructure and architectural
design of living spaces, and, on some accounts, the effectiveness and reach of
health delivery networks.''^ Examples of particularly striking interventions and
research in this vein include the wide-reaching public sanitation programs and
hygiene campaigns implemented in the United States in the early part of the
twentieth century, to which the lion's share of the country's radically reduced
mortality rate from infectious disease today can be attributed.'" Another is the
over-two-decades-long "Whitehall" studies in the U.K., finding a strong
correlation between occupational "grade" and risk factors for coronary heart
150. See PETER CONRAD, T H E MEDICALIZATION OF SOCIETY: O N THE TRANSFORMATION OF
HUMAN CONDITIONS INTO TREATABLE DISORDERS (2007); VICENTE NAVARRO, CRISIS,
HEALTH, AND MEDICINE: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE (1986); THOMAS SZASZ, T H E MEDICALIZATION
OF EVERYDAY LIFE: SELECTED ESSAYS (2007).
151. See Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi, A Historical Framework for Social Epidemiology, in
SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 3 (Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000); Michael Marmot,
Multilevel Approaches to Understanding Social Determinants, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, su;jra, at
349-
152. See T H E SOCIAL D E T E R M I N A N T S OF H E A L T H (Michael Marmot & Richard G. Wilkinson eds.,
2ded . 2006) .
153. See David Cuder & Grant Miller, The Role of Public Health Improvements in Health Advances:
The Twentieth-Century United States, 42 D E M O G R A P H Y 1 (2005).
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disease among British Civil Servants.''* Research and interventions into social
determinants will, as with lifestyle factors, tend to result in highly
nonexcludable outputs and hence predictably be undersupplied by market
forces.''^ Our analysis thus offers a possible explanation for the widely shared
sense that our current healthcare system is overmedicalized. It also suggests
that, as with behavioral and structural approaches to lifestyle factors, more
research and, especially, more work on developing strategies for
operationalizing the insights from such research into effective interventions,
may be called for.'5*
Finally, while we have used the field of health innovation to illustrate the
implications ofthe continuum of excludability, the points we develop here are
generalizable. Consider the problem of climate change. Strategies to address it
range from technologies such as biofuels, to attempts to change attitudes
toward consumption or reorganize cities to emphasize walking, biking, and
public transport. Exclusion rights will reward the former set of more
excludable innovations more than the latter set of behavioral and structural
interventions. Another possible measure is carbon sequestration, a strategy that
includes measures as diverse as reforestation,'^ subterranean injection of
carbon dioxide,''* and chemical scrubbing.''' Some of these approaches are
154. The studies found a three-fold greater risk of mortality from coronary heart disease for the
lowest as compared to highest grade, of which only forty percent was traceable to standard
idendfiable factors (such as smoking, obesity, baseline illness, leisure dme/physical activity,
or height differendals). The remaining sixty percent was attdbuted to job-related stress and
anxiedes, stemming from differences in job security and control over, satisfaction from, and
support in, one's daily work. See M.G. Marmot et al.. Health Inequalities Among British Civil
Servants: The Whitehall II Study, 337 LANCET 1387 (1991); M.G. Marmot, M.J. Shipley &
Geoffrey Rose, Inequalities in Death —Specific Explanations of a General Pattern?, 323 LANCET
1003 (1984) ; Caroline T.M. van Rossum et al.. Employment Grade Differences in Cause Specific
Mortality: A 2S Year Follow Up of Civil Servants from the First Whitehall Study, 54 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & C O M M U N I T Y H E A L T H 178 (2000) .
155. Not all intervendons aimed at social determinants will involve informadon goods —some are
more classically "infrastructural" goods. Nevertheless, research into the role of the
determinants targeted by such intervendons will generate information goods, as will studies
o f the potendal efficacy even of noninformational intervendons.
156. Precisely this assessment was offered by the Wor ld Health Organizadon's Commission on
Social Determinants in its 2008 Final Report : "The evidence base on health inequity, the
social determinants of health, and what works to improve them needs fiirther
strengthening." C o m m ' n on Soc. Determinadons of Health, Closing the Gap in a Generation:
Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, WORLD HEALTH O R G . 20
(2008), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publicadons/2oo8/978924i5637O3_eng.pdf.
157. Carbon Sequestration Through Reforestation: A Local Solution with Global Implications, EPA
(Mar. 2012), http://www.epa.gov/aml/revital/cseqfact.pdf.
158. Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, EPA, ht tp: / /water .epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic
/wells_sequestradon.cfm (last updated July 30, 2012).
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likely more excludable than others.'*" The problem of nonexcludability may,
however, be muted in the environmental context by an institutional factor:
because climate change is responsive to endemic externalities, structural
solutions may be especially likely to be mediated by government action,
rendering enforcement of exclusion rights even on immaterial solutions easier.
For example, a patent on a reforestation strategy might be quite excludable if
governments rather than individuals were the primary users of the knowledge.
Is there a continuum of excludability in more mundane contexts—for
example, those related to conventional consumer goods? Theoretically, the
answer is yes: some means of meeting consumer needs and wants are likely to
be more excludable than others, and those will be better rewarded by a patent
system. Imagine that we want to reduce household drudgery. An innovator
might address the problem of ineffective dishwashers by designing a more
technologically sophisticated dishwasher (stronger jets, different settings), or
by testing and validating nontechnological solutions (using less soap, adding
vinegar). The continuum of excludability is, then, in principle universal.
Nevertheless, the implications of asymmetrical excludability may be more
difficult to see or less consequential in certain domains, such as where the cost
of research on the whole is relatively low. Famously, patents are thought to be
relatively unimportant outside of the resource-intensive, easy-to-copy context
of Pharmaceuticals and the chemical arts.'*' If the cost of research into the
nonexcludable solutions is low enough, for example, then the problem of
nonexcludability will have less significance.
B. Specific Policy Prescriptions
A first, foundational policy implication of our analysis has already been
159. Scrubbing the Skies, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 2009, http://wv\rw.economist.com/node/i3i74375.
160. Technology-focused solutions like chemical scrubbing, which relies on patented invendons
to absorb carbon dioxide from the air, would be pardcularly amenable to exclusion. Assume
that a carbon tax created a private market for the reducdon of carbon intensity. Inventors
could profit by selling the scrubbers both the government and the private sector.
See, e.g.. Pulling Proflts Out of Carbon Capture: An Interview, Bus. PUNDIT, May 20,
2010, http://www.businesspundit.com/pulling-profits-out-of-carbon-capture-an-interview
(describing patented technology that would absorb carbon dioxide to produce marketable
chemicals). By comparison, grassland management techniques for sequestering carbon
dioxide —such as the use of cover crops, reduced dllage, and even the introduction of
earthworms—would be difficult to exclude others from copying and not readily amenable to
sale. See Richard T. Conant, Keith Pausdan & Edward T. Elliott, Grassland Management and
Conversion into Grassland: Effects on Soil Carbon, 11 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 343 (2001)
(reviewing the literature on these techniques).
161. See Cohen et al., supra note 61, at 1; Levin et al., supra note 61, at 796. ii'
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underlined: we provide a new justification for a significant role in our
innovation system for institutional approaches, such as direct public funding,
prize schemes, and commons-based approaches that do not rely on
exclusionary mechanisms to enable the generation of expensive information
goods. That role is justified on two related grounds: these approaches fill in a
gap left by patents' failure to incent valuable but highly nonexcludable
innovations, and they counter the tendency of patents to exacerbate the
problem by drawing resources away from such innovations.
Our analysis, then, bolsters the already strong case for public funding of
basic research. Traditionally, that case has lieen based on some combination of
the folloviáng factors: basic research is too "upstream" to be funded by the
private sector, meaning that its practical dividends are too uncertain and far off
in time to be adequately supported by market incentives;'*^ basic research's
strongly "cumulative" aspects favor a financing model that keeps it free from
proprietary encumbrances;'*' and finally, the motivations and ethos of "open
science" have proved durable institutional supports for such research, and these
are better sustained in public sector settings such as universities than for-profit
firms.'*'* To these we add a further consideration: a large share of the most
valuable uses of basic research will talce highly abstract, intangible forms,
rendering the output of such research highly nonexcludable and hence
particularly ill suited to be generated by markets and patents.
Nonexdudability does not, however, simply add to the traditional case for
public funding of basic research; it also transforms that case by expanding it
beyond its traditional ambit. The scope of public funding should not be
restricted to basic research, but rather should extend into other domains that
also involve valuable but highly nonexcludable information goods. The
government already carries out or sponsors some research that is far from the
"basic" variety supported by the literature. The head-to-head drug trials
mentioned earlier are a good example.'*' The checklist research is another.
162. See Nelson, supra note 19, at 304.
163. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 39, at 306-08; STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF
. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 148-49 (2004). For the pioneering treatment of patent barriers
in cumulative innovation contexts, see Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
164. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
• Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and
Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101
(2001); Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific
Research, 13 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 145, 145-46, 157 (1996); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights arui the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
165. ALLHAT 2002, supra note 77, at 2994.
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Why, given the proximity of this research to practical applications, is it being
undertaken by a public agency? The continuum of nonexcludability supplies an
answer. Public agencies ought forthrightly to recognize nonexcludability as an
additional reason for their mandate to support innovation, one that extends
that mandate to projects more "downstream" than basic or even applied
research. And in fulfilling this mandate, agencies should more systematically
and saliendy identify the criteria relevant to evaluating potential projects falling
under this purview.
This mandate might be operationalized in a variety of ways. Government
agencies might offer dedicated funding for categories of highly nonexcludable
research, as was recendy done for comparative effectiveness research.'** Or peer
review systems might be adjusted to promote nonexcludable research. For
example, peer reviewers evaluating applications for National Institutes of
Health (NIH) grants might be asked to score research proposals according to
their propensity to produce highly nonexcludable outputs.'*^ To do this well,
agencies would first have to systematically elaborate different categories of
highly nonexcludable research, building upon the initial list enumerated here
(i.e., negative information and comparative-effectiveness information for
drugs, basic epidemiological information, information about behavioral and
structural interventions in lifestyle, and innovations in health care quality).
Notably, government agencies may be affected by their own dynamics of
cultural entrenchment and path dependence, dynamics that would pose
barriers to the reorientation we suggest here. A recent comment in Nature
argues, in this vein, that there is an institutional bias within the NIH in favor
166. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301,124 Stat. 119, 727-47
(2010) (establishing the Patent-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to conduct
comparative clinical effectiveness research); see abo Comparative Effectiveness Research,
HEALTH AFF., http://virww.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=27 (rev.
Oct. 8, 2010) (describing the provisions of the Affordable Care Act aimed at improving
comparative effectiveness research).
167. Peer review at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) involves five scored review criteria
(significance, investigator, innovation, approach, and environment), which contribute
loosely to an overall impact score. Peer Review Process, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/peer_review_process.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). To
implement our recommendation, the NIH could adopt a sixth review criterion to refiect the
proposal's potential to produce nonexcludable innovations. Such an approach has some
precedent: in 1997, the NIH included "innovation" as a review criterion, over the
objections of some researchers, to further the goal of producing unconventional ideas.
See Robert Finn, Researchers Get Ready for NIH Reforms, SCIENTIST, Aug. 18,
1997, http://virww.the-scientist.conV'?articles.view/articleNo/i8552/tide/Researchers-Get
-Ready-For-NIH-Reforms. A perhaps more conservative alternative would be to modify the
language of one of the existing review criteria to reflect the importance of encouraging
nonexcludable, public health-oriented discoveries.
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of biomédical approaches to health and against behavioral, sociological, and
environmental approaches.'** The author notes, for example, that
[bjetween 80% and 90% of lung cancers have been hnked to smoking
tobacco. Yet of the $2.45 billion that the NIH has spent on trying to
flnd a cure during the. past decade, most has been directed towards the
discovery of molecular and genetic causes and treatments rather than
on establishing how to modify people's behaviour.'*'
To translate this into the terms of our Essay, this critique suggests that the
NIH focuses on one lcind of nonexcludable research (basic science that may
lead to therapeutics) to the exclusion of others (behavioral interventions, basic
epidemiology, or the understanding of social and environmental factors that
generate disease). This argument reminds us that the public, as well as private,
sector may be subject to dynamics of cultural entrenchment and path
dependence. Moreover, we might expect that a private sector oriented toward
highly excludable interventions would pressure the government to allocate its
funding toward precursors to those excludable intervendons - for example,
toward biomarlcers or the basic biology of disease, rather than toward
nonexcludable soludons such as environmental or behavioral changes that
would compete with therapeutic interventions.'^"
Progress on this front is already being made. The Affordable Care Act
included several measures that respond to these criticisms, including allocation
not only toward cost-effectiveness research, but also toward broad research
into prevention for health.'^' These provisions reflect the fact that government
funding can target a wide range of nonexcludable goods, even if existing
168. Michael M. Crow, Time To Rethink the NIH, 471 NATURE 569, 571 (2011) (advocating a
"transdisciplinary" approach to research that reflects the "convergence" culture in today's
life sciences).
169. Id. at 570-71.
170. The Bayh-Dole Act, which sought to induce mote commercialization of public sector
research by permitting federal grantees to obtain patents more easily, may have brought the
problems of nonexcludability more direcdy into the public sector. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94
Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2006)).
171. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4001 (creating the National Prevention, Health
Promotion, and Public Health Council to "develop a national prevention, health promotion,
public health, and integrative health care strategy"); id. § 4002 (creating and providing
funding for the Prevention and Public Health Fund). But see Betsy McKay, What Obama's
Budget Proposal Means for Disease Prevention, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Feb. 14, 2012,
4:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2o12/o2/14/what-obamas-budget-proposal-means-for
-disease-prevention (describing how President Obama's 2013 budget would reduce funding
.for the Prevention and Public Health Fund and how existing funds are being used to
compensate for cuts elsewhere).
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allocations are shaped by social, political, and historical factors, as well as by
scientific judgment. The existing allocation of government research shows at
the same time that government can and does fund a variety of nonexcludable
research, and that the concept of nonexcludability, if developed and articulated
in relation to existing funding programs, could yield important changes in the
allocation of the more than thirty billion dollars that the federal government
spends on health research each year.
Another avenue by which government might foster the supply of valuable
nonexcludable information is the use of prizes. Indeed, prize mechanisms are
the alternative innovation policy that has received the most attention in recent
years, not only from legal and economic scholars,'̂ ^ but also in broader public
policy debates.'^' Perhaps the key attraction of prize systems is their potential to
finance innovation without the distortions of patent pricing (something they
share with public funding), while simultaneously harnessing (like patents), the
decentralized information of market actors regarding the most promising lines
of attack for whatever innovation targets are specified. It is in the specification
ofthe targets, however, where the greatest promise and peril of prizes may lie.
On the one hand, by severing the direct link between innovator returns and
market sales that exists under patents, prize systems raise concerns regarding
the incentives and information of those setting the criteria and amounts for
prizes. That is, will prize administrators have either the competence or, when
exposed to lobbying and fiscal pressures, the willingness to set rewards
accurately to refiect the social value of innovations? On the other hand,
advocates of prizes point to ways in which such systems may actually improve
upon patent signals of social value. These include, principally, augmenting
returns to factor in the positive externalities (or spillover effects) of innovations
on follow-on research,'̂ "* and amplifying the value of those innovations that
predominandy serve poorer markets (and thus where demand signals would
significandy understate social value).'"
Against this background, nonexcludability considerations shed interesting
new light on the comparative virtues of prizes vis-à-vis the alternatives. At first
blush, prizes would seem akin to government funding in their ability' to
172. See sources cited supra note 38.
173. See, e.g. Medical Innovadon Prize Act, S. 1137, 112th Cong . (2012); Prize F u n d for
HIV/AIDS Act, S. 1138, 112th Cong. (2012) ; The High Cost of High Prices for HPZ/AIDS Drugs
and the Prize Fund Alternative: Hearing on S. 1138 Before the S. Subcomm. on Primary Health
and Aging ofthe Comm. on Health, Educ, Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong . (2012). ¿ • -
174. Kremer, supra note 38, at 1141-44; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 31, at 543-45.
175. See, e.g.. Fisher & Syed, supra note 38, at 181-86; Hollis & Pogge, supra note 38, at 18; Love &
Hubbard , supra note 38, at 1532-34.
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improve upon patents in this respect: just as we might operationalize a concern
for nonexcludable innovations by supplementing in various ways the
tradidonal criteria for allocating government grants, so too we might explicitly
take into account nonexcludability factors when determining the criteria for
prizes. There remains, however, a significant difference between the two
strategies. Although the criteria for prizes may be configured to incentivize a
broader set of innovadons than under patent, some of the most promising
recent models of prizes will be constrained by an important limitation. In order
to help measure the size of the prize, many recent prize mechanisms operate by
using the sales of some discrete good as their substrate measure of social value
(which then may be adjusted upward or downward).'^* Being tethered to a
commodified measure of output serves to retain a comparative advantage of
prizes (shared with patents) vis-à-vis public funding, namely proximity of the
metric of social value to quantifiable market measures. But to the extent that
prizes retain this proximity, nonexcludability analysis presents an Achilles heel
for prizes that is similar to the one it presents for patents. Many nonexcludable
innovations-such as behavioral or structural interventions inducing changes
in eating habits or exercise or other lifestyle behavior-will not be linked to any
commodifiable good or otherwise easily traceable uses. Consequendy, to
incentivize such innovadons, prize systems will need to implement valuation
mechanisms that travel some distance away from a dght linlc to patent-like
tracking schemes, and closer to the sorts of decisions involved in public
funding.
But configuring prize mechanisms in this way will be no simple task. Public
funding schemes require direcdy maldng rough assessments of the likely social
value of various projects and then, accordingly, allocating grants up-front. The
rewards held out by prize systems, however, are typically determined ex post,
by tracldng in some way a proxy or actual measure of the impact of the eligible
innovation over some specified period of time and space. To be sure, the most
ambitious prize proposals in this respect contemplate the use of quite intricate
methods for assessing impact, which may ultimately sever their measure of
social value from any reliance on indirect proxies such as sales data, and look
instead direcdy at observed outcomes in terms of specific indicators, e.g.,
reduced disease incidence or improved health in a target population after the
introducdon of an innovadon.'^ And such methods, if reliably established,
would indeed be suitable for evaluating highly nonexcludable interventions.
176. See, e.^., Love & Hubbard, supra note 38, at 1528-29 ; Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 31, at
526; see abo Kremer, supra note 38, at 1138-40 (proposing an aucdon system that requires
that the invendons up for bid have a market value).
177. See, e.g.. Fisher & Syed, supra note 38, at 181-86; HoUis & Pogge, supra note 38, at 29-31.
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However, they are not yet at the proof-of-concept stage and the complexity and
costs in establishing them may ultimately prove insurmountably high, due in
part to the presence of confounding variables (e.g., how much ofthe reduced
heart disease in a target population should be attributed to a structural
intervention aimed at increasing exercise at the office versus various other
possible contributors?). Should that be the case, then for some subset of highly
nonexcludable innovations public funding may be superior not only to patents
but also to prizes.
Finally, on top ofthe financial incentives held out by alternative innovation
schemes, another arrow in the governmental quiver is the imposition of
regulatory requirements. FDA regulations are one example; they require firms
to validate the safety and efficacy of their candidate drugs through clinical trials
before receiving marketing approval.''^ These requirements create incentives
for firms to generate and disclose valuable information about their drug
products that they might otherwise not provide. Indeed, addressing this
market failure in information production is a standard economic justification
for FDA regulation (and related systems such as tort liability).'" And so, as
with direct funding and prizes, we might imagine broadening the regulatory
ambit to take into account nonexdudability considerations. For example, rather
than funding or rewarding comparative effectiveness research, government
might instead extend FDA requirements beyond ensuring the safety and
efficacy of drugs against placebos to also include the need to generate
comparator data.'*° Of course, regulatory strategies will also be limited in a
variety of ways. For example, while we might reconfigure FDA requirements to
generate more reliable comparative or negative information on drugs, there is
178. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2006).
179. See, e.g., HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & J O H N M . V E R N O N , T H E REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: BALANCING T H E BENEFITS AND RISKS 7-8 (1983); Ariel Katz,
Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MiCH. T E L E C O M M .
& T E C H . L . R E V . 1, 7-8, 12-14 (2007); Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.
LEGAL S T U D . 205,211 (1973).
180. Existing FDA rules do, in limited cases, require comparative ev idence- for instance, where it
is deemed unethical to deny patients access to existing treatments in a trial for a new
candidate drug. In such cases, the candidate treatment need not be shown to be superior to a
placebo; rather, it need only be shown to be not inferior to the existing treatment—i.e., the
purpose of the trials is to rule out a treatment difference of an unacceptable size between the
new drug and the active control (the new drug, that is, must preserve a "reasonable fraction"
o f t h e beneficial effect o f t h e existing treatment). The trials are not taken to establish the
comparative effectiveness o f the new treatment against the active control, and moreover, the
comparator baseline itself is quite limited, typically comprised of only one existing treatment
rather than, as is preferable, multiple treatments within one or more therapeutic classes. See
Robert Temple, A Regulator's View of Comparative Effectiveness Research, 9 CLINICAL TRIALS
56,56-57(2012).
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no corollary regulatory barrier that could be twealced to help produce
nonexcludable information about lifestyle and health or health quality
research.'^' Moreover, even with respect to the evidence on risks or safety that
falls within the existing regulatory purview, to the extent that such regulation
is somewhat leaky-as plausibly suggested by a growing body of critical
literature on the FDA'*'-then again the nonexcludability of such evidence
threatens its undersupply.
C. Broader Theoretical Implications
The existence of a continuum of nonexcludability, we have argued, has
substantial implications for innovation theory and policy as viewed from inside
the frame of standard economic analysis. Our argument may also, however,
bear some implications for the uses and limits of such economic analysis
181. Information on environmental toxins lies somewhere in between. On the one hand, much of
the relevant information may in principle be generated and disclosed by the firms whose
industrial products and processes release such toxins into the environment. And thus
significant gains may be made by improving the regulatory requirements aimed at securing
adequate information disclosure at the individual-firm level, as is frequendy advocated in
the environmental law and policy literature. See John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap:
Balancing the Supply and Demand for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1385-95
(2008); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law To
Produce Needed Information on Health arid the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619 (2004).
However, as we note above, supra note 113 and accompanying text, much of the information
may not lend itself to firm-specific strategies, pertaining instead to combinations of
chemicals from many sources and over long periods of time. In this case, more direct
strategies of information generation will likely be needed. See abo Mary L. Lyndon,
Information Economics and Chemical Toxidty: Designing Laws To Produce and Use Data, 87
M I C H . L . REV. 1795, 1812, 1835-41 (1989) (noting that "epidemiological data suffer from
many confounding factors, including multiple exposures, undetermined exposures,. . . poor
record-keeping [and] latency periods of. . . twenty years or more," and advocating the
creation of a publicly mandated "super study" research program on environmental toxins).
182. The critical concerns center on the strong financial incentives of drug companies-which
are, by and large, unchecked by any countervailing incentives on the part of others owing to
nonexcludability-to favorably shape the research undertaken to establish the safety and
efficacy of their products, through, inter alia, faulty design protocols, conflicts of interest in
evaluating results, suppression of negative findings, and skewed reporting of positive
results. See generally J O H N ABRAMSON, OVERDO$ED AMERICA: T H E BROKEN PROMISE OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE (2004) (examining how major drug companies have commercialized
medical knowledge); ANGELL, supra note 73 (sarhe); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES:
T H E BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2005) (analyzing the role of
market factors in the tradeoff between safety and effectiveness in medicine); JEROME P.
KASSIRER, O N THE TAKE: H O W AMERICA'S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER
YOUR HEALTH (2005) (arguing that the financial enticements that drug companies offer
physicians degrade the quality of treatment).
1957
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 122:1900 2013
itself'^' Principally, it suggests two things.
Eirst, our argument highlights a previously unnoticed means by which
patents-and the pursuit of efficiency through patent law-can generate
conflict with values such as privacy and free speech. Using property rights to
generate information goods creates incentives to undermine norms that
interfere with the ability to profit through exclusion, such as norms of privacy,
free expression, and open communication. At the limit, the pursuit of maximal
allocative efficiency through a fully rationalized regime of property rights, in
which excludability direcdy tracked social value, would require the eradication
of such norms in connection to the protected informadon. In other words,
attempts to achieve efficiency v\dll have implications for our ability to protect
values such as privacy, free speech, and so forth. Because nonproperty
approaches to information production, such as public funding, will have
different implications for these values, debates about the choice of innovation
regime (or mix of regimes) should be conducted with values other than
efficiency in mind.'*"*
Concerns about the- possibility that IP rights will create incentives to
undermine privacy are recognized, even if implicidy, in two existing literatures.
In a line of judicial decisions regarding patentable subject matter, courts have
forbidden and expressed discomfort vidth patents on purely "mental processes"
or mere "mental steps," or patents that would prevent others from simply
183. We thank Seana Shiffrin for urging us to develop more fiilly this aspect of our argument, as
well as for very stimulating suggestions in this regard.
184. A possible response would be that values such as privacy and free speech can be reduced to a
common denominator of efficiency by accounting for how much people prize such values in
dollar terms. But the difficulties with this are considerable. For one, it is very difficult to
price or otherwise quantify individual preferences with respect to goods that are not
commonly traded in markets. At the very least, a welfarist approach must develop
procedures for pricing or otherwise weighing these values. Additionally, as discussed supra
Section III.A, people's preferences may to some extent be endogenous to the choice of
institutional mechanism. This underscores, at a minimum, the need for great care in
deciding how much to weigh such values (using whatever procedure is selected), given the
potentially far-reaching, path-shaping effects of such decisions. Even this may be
inadequate, however, where people also have "preferences about their preferences" — that is,
they care about the extent to which they will continue to hold their commitments to certain
norms or values. In that event, a welfarist would also need to consult and duly factor in
these second-order preferences. See, e.g., J O N ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1984) ; William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L . REV. 1659 (1988). Such calculations are at best daunting, and in fact
may lead to an infinite regress, as our attempts to discern higher-order preferences reach
ever further back, to third-, fourth-, etc.-order views. Ultimately, then, some more direct
way of reasoning about such values seems necessary.
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"thinldng" about certain processes or correlations.'^' The patent applicants in
question presumably thought that the challenged claims were excludable
enough, despite any social-norm or technical barriers, to malee the applicadon
privately cost effective. The fact that courts disallow these claims as a whole
may be explained by an implicit judgment that the social costs of such
enforcement efforts would be too high and that, as a result, such efforts should
not be given judicial imprimatur or encouragement.'** Similarly, a growing
number of observers have pointed to the fact that IP rights holders, seeking to
make their legal entidements more practically excludable, have deployed digital
rights management (DRM) technologies in ways that clash with the interests
of consumers in privacy and online anonymity.'*''
Recognizing the impact of intellectual property rights on privacy, free
speech, and related norms also helps us see more acutely some of the possible
consequences of the commodification of information. There are familiar lines
of critique of commodification, which suggest that it adversely affects the social
meaning of certain goods or relations, violates certain rights, or corrodes
solidaristic norms.'** Here, we show something different: norms place limits
185. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136-38 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissendng from dismissal of cerdorari as improvidendy granted) (arguing that a
patent claim that covered a correladon between blood test results and vitamin deficiency, in
conjuncdon with the administradon of a blood test, should be invalidated, because it
covered an unpatented test and the act of simply "think[ing] about" its results); Gottschalk
V. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (noting that "mental processes" are unpatentable subject
matter); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (rejecdng claims for idendfying
equadons for spectrographic analysis as impermissible patendng of "mental steps"). It is
tangendal to our focus here whether such statements should be taken to mark out a disdnct
category of ineligible subject matter ("mental processes") or merely to idendfy one element
often present in another of the recognized categories (such as "fundamental pdnciples" or
"abstract ideas").
186. Of course, if we assume that in at least some of these cases a patent would have provided an
important incentive to innovate, these decisions remain somewhat incomplete. They only
inform us that patents are not an opdon where they bump against certain deeply held
values, but they sdll leave open the quesdon of what alternative options we should pursue.
187. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY T E C H . L.J. 575 (2003); Ian Kerr &
Jane Bailey, The Implications of Digital Rights Management for Privacy and Freedom of
Expression, 2 INFO. CoMM. & ETHICS SOC'Y 87 (2004); Chdstopher May, Digital Rights
Management and the Breakdown of Social Norms, 8 FIRST MONDAY 11, 37-39 (2003),
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1097/1017.
188. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) ; MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (2011); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, W H A T MONEY CAN'T BUY:
T H E MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); DEBRA SATZ, W H Y SOME THINGS SHOULD N O T BE
EOR SALE: T H E MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2010); Yochai Benkler, Law, Policy, and
Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A N E W THEORY OF REGULATION 299
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on our ability to commodify, and when we seek to commodify in the face of
these norms, we may inadvertently weaken the norms in question. This is not
because (as the conventional critiques of commodification might suggest) we
are sending a corrosive message that markets are a valid way to value the goods
at stake, but because, more broadly, we are encouraging people to weaken
norms that interfere with their ability to profit from commodification (here, via
exclusion). The norms themselves may be that some things should not be
commodified, but they may also include norms not directly related to the issue
of commodification, such as privacy.
This brings us to a second implication of our account: when we reason
about the consequences of innovation policy using economic tools, we should
adopt a comparative-institutional approach, one that emphasizes a diversity of
policy tools and, as importantly, recognizes that any judgment on the right mix
will inevitably take the form of pursuing local improvements rather than a
global optimum. An optimizing view tends to focus primarily on one
mechanism, property rights, and sees that as a means to directly transmit
signals of social value to those making allocative decisions. But as we have
argued, property rights may send distorted signals, overemphasizing the value
of solutions that lie on the more excludable end of the condnuum. To be sure,
it has long been recognized that property rights must be fine-tuned in ways
that are difficult to square with the optimizing view. (For example,
policymakers must establish the extent of exclusionary protection, whether and
how property rights apply to different Idnds of information, when a given level
of protection will be worth its potential costs of barriers to access and rent
dissipation, and so forth.) However, once we recognize that no amount of
fine-tuning will capture all valuable information goods and, moreover, that
each expansion of property rights threatens an inefficient diversion of resources
away from some such goods, we can see that even finely tuned property rights
cannot lead to a global optimum.
Reasoning about the most efficient mode to produce information should be
understood as a process of maldng rough judgments about which mix of
institutional mechanisms are likely to achieve a better overall balance of
different hazards and benefits in a given context. By referring to the need for
"judgment," we mean to highlight and resist any attempt to avoid judgment by
simply deferring to the market, since doing so will simply involve its own, now
implicit, judgment. If, as we have shown, property rights in information are
themselves potentially distorting, then even if our sole aim is to achieve
efficiency, we cannot assign decisions about allocation solely to the market.
(Edward J. Balieisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010); Samuel Bowles, Is Liberal Society a
Parasite on Tradition?, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 46 (2011).
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The judgments that people malee, moreover, should be recognized as
inevitably "rough" because of the broad range of contingent and contextual
factors that infiuence the choices that we face. Recall that the effectiveness of
property rights and, correspondingly, the need for alternative institutional
approaches are a function ofthe state of technology, norms, and institutions, as
well as the factors of materiality and numerosity. These factors themselves will
be context specific and evolving. It will therefore sometimes be difficult to say
precisely where a given set of information goods will fall along the continuum
of excludability, and thus to determine how extensive our reliance on
nonproperty approaches should be.'^' Moreover, technologies, norms, and
institutions will, as we noted earlier, be affected by the existence (and
magnitude) of such rights since the rights will incentivize their holders to
shape the development of these factors in a manner conducive to increasing the
reach of their entidements. This observation adds an element of recursivity to
the picture, and the highly uncertain character of the resulting calculations is
fairly dear.
To a considerable extent, our call for rough institutional judgment is in line
with Demsetz's own original article, which is itself within a Hayelcian tradition
of maidng comparative judgments about which policies are better suited to
achieve more or less efficient outcomes starting from local baselines.''"
Demsetz, however, implicidy conceptualizes our choice as one between systems.
189. The problem is somewhat akin to that of determining public expenditures on basic research:
once we recognize that sole reliance on property rights and markets will be both inadequate
and distortionary, we then need somehow to make judgments regarding not only the likely
value of various lines of research or areas of innovative activity, but also the extent to which
the resulting outputs will possess characteristics (e.g., distant time horizons, high degree of
nonexcludabiliry) that necessitate nonexclusionary forms of innovation support.
190. By "Hayekian" here we mean to refer to both of Hayek's information-based or "epistemic"
economic arguments. One is the argument that Demsetz explicitiy relies on, which we
review supra note 35 and accompanying text, namely, the information-based argument in
favor of markets as against govemment decisionmaking. See Hayek, supra note 35. Roughly
contemporaneous to that, however, Hayek advanced another argument, now an
information-based critique of neoclassical economic reasoning, asserting that the search for
equilibria that are in some sense globally optimal is misguided in the face of the severe
epistemic hurdles facing any such approach. See F.A. von Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, 4
ECONÓMICA 33 (1937). This raises, of course, the interesting question of the connection
between these two arguments, and in particular the issue of what criteria, if not those of
neoclassical efficiency, are to be used in assessing Hayek's claim of the economic superiority
of markets to planning. The "Hayekian" answer, we believe, is along the lines of what we set
out here, namely, a comparative-institutional approach that is more modest in its
consequentialist evaluative criteria, both in terms of starting from local baselines rather than
looking for global optima and in terms of realistically choosing among various imperfect or
"second-best" institutional options rather than thinldng in "nirvana" terms about
institutional choices in their idealized forms.
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A comparative-institutional perspective suggests instead an investigation of
which systems might be best in a given context, and suggests that a mix of
approaches may well be superior to a single approach.
Moreover, as we contemplate the appropriate mix of approaches, we must
also consider the ways that different institutional approaches interact with one
another. That is, we cannot assume that different approaches do not interfere
with each other. As we have shown, there is reason to think that the property
approach poses a threat to other approaches, with its distortions of the
investment environment away from nonexcludable strategies and its possible
entrenchment through forms of competitive hostility and cumulative
acculturation effects. Other institutional approaches also have potential biases,
but these are better known: for example, there is a risk that decisions about the
allocation of government research funding vsdll be influenced by repeat players
who drive research toward their own domains, rather than more productive
alternatives pursued by upstart competitors. We need, then, to conceptualize
our innovation ecosystem as an ecosystem in the deep sense of the word, which
is to say, as subject to complex and mutually constitutive interactions between
component parts — interactions that should be an important part of our study
of that system..
Finally, in evaluating different institutional alternatives and their
interactions, we should not restrict our criteria to considerations of efficiency
and the impact on values such as privacy and free speech. Rather, our
argument offers two reasons for looking to a broader set of considerations. One
is that the indeterminacy afflicting economic analysis we have underlined
simply necessitates judgments that rely, at least implicitly, on other
considerations as well. Moreover, when such judgments pertain not just to the
existence and scope of property rights but also to the role of alternative
institutional arrangements, then the possibility that such alternatives may
perform better on certain nonefficiency criteria (such as distributive
considerations) mandates giving such criteria careful consideration.
CONCLUSION
A proper appreciation of the continuum of excludability, we have argued,
has significant implications for innovation theory and policy. Patents, as
property rights, do not act simply as transparent conduits for market signals,
but rather may introduce their own allocative distortions. While others have
recognized before that appropriability is limited even where patents exist,
many of these arguments suggest that more extensive patent protection can
remedy the problem, leaving intact the allocative case for reliance on patents.
In contrast, the continuum of excludability shows that market-based
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approaches to innovation have a comparative disadvantage with respect to
allocations toward highly nonexcludable goods, making it clear that patents do
not act as a neutral conduit for information about social welfare. We have not,
of course, established the superiority of any particular type or mix of
alternatives, but we have provided an additional set of what we believe to be
powerful arguments for the necessity of, and in certain areas comparative
superiority of, alternative institutional approaches to innovation. Einally, to
properly examine and evaluate these alternatives — as well as the interactive
effects of their possible coexistence—will often require us to deploy (indeed, to
ftirther develop) a broader set of analytical tools, and attend to their
unavoidable implications for a vidder range of values beyond efficiency.
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